

JPRS 79399

9 November 1981

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1191

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INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET AMBASSADOR INTERVIEWED ON RELATIONS WITH THAILAND, KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 2 Sep 81 p 5

[Interview with Yuriy Ivanovich Kuznetsov, Soviet ambassador to Thailand]

[Text] [Question] The world situation and relations between Bangkok and Moscow have changed greatly and rapidly. What are your views on these subjects?

[Answer] I would like to begin with international matters and from there go on to relations between our two countries.

At present, there are problems in that the United States has begun the foundation for the all-out production of neutron weapons including the installation of neutron weapons in various places. As is generally known, the Soviet Union made an announcement via TASS on 14 August 1981, which has been widely disseminated.

Our protest also appeared in announcements by Leonid Brezhnev on two or three subsequent occasions. In March 1978, the Soviet Union proposed to the Commission on Reduction of Forces headquartered in Geneva that a protocol be drafted on halting the production, installation and use of nuclear weapons. We feel that this document is of special significance and we will continue to be active in bringing this protocol to fruition. We wish to explain that the decision of the United States on neutron weapons is a very dangerous one which will be the cause for more competition in nuclear weapons, creating the risk of nuclear war.

We are not the only country to have such a resolution before the United States; there are serious struggles going on in several countries of Europe, which is understandable given the U.S. decision to install this weapon in Europe. This threat exists not only in Europe, because people in Washington have also said that they would seek opportunities to install this weapon in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean. Aside from that, there are nuclear-armed U.S. submarines on patrol in waters all over the world. This means that there is a threat to every nation.

The United States has claimed that its policy of producing nuclear weapons is one of limiting destruction and that it would attempt to exercise the right of use of this weapon to solve political and military problems in various areas of the world. It claims that there is a Soviet threat. The United States is trying to scare the whole world by claiming that the Soviet Union will invade Europe or the Middle East

or other regions in Europe and so it would have to use these weapons in order to stop Soviet tanks. All of this is a propaganda coup for the U.S. military.

In the last 30 years, the United States has never abandoned these claims and it is necessary for it to use this line further in order [to serve] its plans of expansion and to protect its interests on all continents by pressuring U.S. allies to act in accordance with U.S. plans.

The Soviet Union has taken and is taking steps in line with the fact that the important responsibility in this world is to protect and defend peace. It is necessary to absolutely prohibit the production and installation of neutron weapons. We still have enough time to do that and the movements of nations the world over will force the United States to abandon this idea.

Neutron weapons are not simply a matter between the United States and the Soviet Union, but they concern every country in the world.

[Question] At this time, Thailand is being visited by a great many U.S. delegations. What are your views on this?

[Answer] One can sum up U.S. actions in this region by saying that while the Soviet Union supports good relations and broad contacts among all nations, it is not surprising that the United States would have to send visiting delegations to increase its relations. However, when one considers the announcements by U.S. officials, one can see that these delegations are interested in other matters, aside from trade or cultural matters. The United States is still probably talking about its views of installing weapons and repeating the Soviet threat. The United States has to provide military assistance and maintain alliances that are 30 years old. In fact, the agreements made since 1954 have lost all significance. The Soviet Union and its allies are a threat to no nation in this region, but we have always supported the beginnings of a peace process in the countries of this region, especially by making this region a zone of peace. Therefore, I feel that behind the feverish activity of the U.S. delegations, there are other purposes to the contrary.

Every day, the United States strengthens its forces in every part of the world it views as most important: those with natural resources and in line with its strategic interests.

According to announcements by Washington officials, Southeast Asia is felt to be an important area for U.S. interests. Why is this? The answer is that there is tin, rubber and other natural resources here. Secondly, the shortest distance between the Pacific and Indian Oceans lies here. These are the reasons why the United States is trying to pressure the nations of this area politically and militarily; so as to bring them into line with U.S. policy.

[Question] To what extent will the Soviet Union make more efforts to help the Thai economy, especially to promote exports which Thailand is trying to sell worldwide?

[Answer] Over the past 2 or 3 years, we have had very good trade [relations] with Thailand and trade between the two countries has increased greatly. Even reports in Thai newspapers now show that trade between the Soviet Union and Thailand has increased greatly.

In the first half of this year, the Soviet Union has purchased more of some of Thailand's principal products than other countries, especially two important items: rice and sugar. We are also determined to buy many more goods from Thailand in the future, but this must depend on quality, price and timing. However, in general the Soviet foreign trade organizations are quite satisfied with the quality of Thai agricultural products. Therefore, we see that the future for Thai exports to the Soviet Union is pretty good.

[Question] We are concerned about energy problems. Although we have some hopes concerning natural gas, it is still important and necessary to procure alternate energy sources at this time. What plans does the Soviet Union have to help Thailand in solving the energy problem, an important economic issue?

[Answer] You are correct in being concerned about the energy problem, which is a worldwide problem, not only for Thailand and the Soviet Union. Scientific research to find alternative energy sources other than oil, such as solar power, wind power and others is something on which we now have Deputy Prime Minister Maj Gen Praman Adireksan visiting the Soviet Union as a guest of the USSR Government. He has expressed interest in seeing our efforts to solve the energy problem.

We have no secrets in this matter and we think we could cooperate with the Thai Government in working together on development of energy from Thailand's oil shale. We have welcomed many Thai delegations who have come to see our work in this sector.

We have submitted a firm plan to the Thai Government. The only thing left is to start implementing things along these lines. We think this could be done in terms of the aforementioned cooperation.

[Question] Concerning relations between Thailand and the USSR...

[Answer] Relations between the USSR and Thailand have grown and progressed gradually, bit by bit. I can't really cite a clear example of this, but I believe things will grow in the future. However, I see that we have a firm basis on which to make our relations grow in some areas and we are ready to promote and encourage these. This year, we have had numerous Soviet delegations visiting Thailand, most notably that of the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body with the ultimate power in the nation. Aside from that we have delegations from cooperatives, which have proposed cooperation with Thailand's cooperative movement. We have also had women's delegations come for visits and bilateral discussions.

For these reasons, in April, we had discussions at the foreign ministry level in Bangkok when Mr Firyubin, Soviet vice foreign minister, came. Both Thailand and the USSR felt that it was important to continue these discussions in the future.

These are the results of our bilateral relations over the past 8 months, aside from those matters mentioned previously.

[Question] What are your views about reports that a new Thai communist party has been established? According to reports, they use the name "New Party." The party has a base of operations in Indochina, close allies supported by the Soviet Union.

[Answer] First of all, I would like to tell you that I don't know about this and there is no way to link this to the Soviet Union.

Generally speaking, in theory, setting up a party is an internal matter for that country, especially in that the party being established must serve in its capacity as the representative of the people, or said another way, to serve the interests of the nation. But when I think about this, it is not likely that a party has been established outside the country to be compelled to come in and operate internally. That party would be the ultimate farce, a phony organization which could not exist because it would have no base whatsoever inside the country.

As to news reports about the establishment of this new party, I think they probably are fabrications. I personally think that China has the most interest in fabricating this matter, because China is trying to find an excuse for its support of subversive groups in every corner of Asia.

During his visit to Thailand, China's Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed that China's policy was to cement relations with these subversives, by claiming that if they didn't, the Soviet Union would do so. We can view Zhao's comments from two perspectives:

First, China is trying to blackmail the countries in this region once again by raising the so-called Soviet threat.

Secondly, China is trying to make the excuse that China is correct in trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations in this region. We have protested this to the fullest.

We feel that a situation cannot be permitted whereby a country pursues a two-track contradictory policy: a state-to-state policy and a party-to-party policy. The Soviet Union has one policy. The party and the state policy must be the same, because the party policy is made in the party congress and this is firmly set, disseminated and the government must implement relations with various countries as stipulated by the resolutions of the party congress.

[Question] I would like to know your views on Kampuchea and the fighting along the border with Thailand which has caused losses and death to Thai property and people. As Vietnam's large ally, how will the Soviet Union help relieve the hardships in this matter?

[Answer] Did you know that the present government in Phnom Penh has been in existence for 2 and one-half years? The important thing is that the Kampuchean people support this government. Any effort to change this government will be

fruitless. All others are not the political leaders of the Kampuchean people. They are only "political corpses."

The issue of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea is not the main problem so long as there is interference from movements outside the country against Kampuchea. I believe that Vietnam will stay in Kampuchea as long as there is trouble from the armed groups on Kampuchean soil. These groups are causing hardship for the people of Kampuchea and are also causing problems for the Thai people.

I wish to ask you who is firing weapons into Thai territory. This matter must be studied carefully. I doubt very much that Vietnamese troops are intentionally firing into Thai territory. However, in order to put this problem behind us and to avoid trouble, I think it is necessary to eliminate all these trouble-makers along the border as soon as possible.

CSO: 4207/23

INTERNATIONAL

TURKMEN EMIGRE REPROACHED FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 30 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by Seyitniyaz Atayev, writer and deputy chairman of the Ashkhabad Section of the Soviet War Veterans Committee: "Traitor"]

[Text] Not so long ago he, a 60-year-old, flabby, harassed person, was sitting in his Munich apartment and, fearing solitude, turned on the television. Murad Tachmurat did not like to remain tete-a-tete with his thoughts. They would come at him, each one more frightening than the last.

And as if out of spite, here they were showing the series "Forty Years Ago"—the events of August 1941--Goebbels' newsreel of how Smolensk burned and how the fascists were tearing toward Moscow....

And horror! He saw with some kind of inner sight that fatal day for him of 40 years ago--his treachery. This was in a POW camp of the city of Sebezh of Kalininskaya Oblast, where he, having in cowardly fashion betrayed his comrades, subserviently agreed to serve the enemy. He voluntarily joined the Hitler army's "Turkestan Legion". With the willingness of a lackey, he wormed his way into the trust of the most inveterate fascists. No, he did not for a while yet fire at the commissars. The commissars were for him not abstract entities but yesterday's friends and comrades. With some he had served in the army since 1939, others he had known even earlier, when he had been studying in the pedagogical workers faculty. Now in the camp, however, he had despicably betrayed them, but it was the fascists who did the shooting.

The television screen at that time was showing how the Hitlerites perpetrated outrages in the Ukraine: razed entire villages, shot the peaceful inhabitants, killed children in front of their mothers, tortured the young men and threw old men and women alive into the flames. And all this on the pretext of fighting the partisans.

"It is not I, not I!" the frightened cry broke from today's Murad Tachmurat, and he hastened to turn off the television, but the contemporary official West German commentator stopped him:

"These cruelties were the handiwork of the SS forces!"

There you have it! Official television admits that the SS had perpetrated the cruelest crimes against mankind.

Murad Tachmurat sank back into the armchair. Consequently, he was a true SS man. He cannot escape from the judgment of memory. If he had forgotten (which was unlikely), others remember. The 1st Turkestan Battalion, which was then renamed the 450th Separate Turkestan Battalion of the Reichswehr, had arrived in the city of Yampol' of Sumskaya Oblast on a punitive mission. The battalion consisted of four companies. One of them, the 4th, was German; it had spread terror in Ukrainian villages and was to have served as an example for the Turkestan legionnaires.

Murad Tachmurat stood out among the legionnaires because of his servile devotion to the fascists and his secret reports on the legionnaires who had enlisted in order, when a suitable occasion presented itself, to switch over to their own people. For these qualities Sergeant Major Schmidt, the commander of the Germany company, took him on as his orderly. The orderly was diligent in the extreme. They have not forgotten in Sumskaya Oblast's Khinel'skiy Rayon how he broke into the resident's homes and plundered in the literal sense, bringing back booty for his boss, and tortured those from whom he was unable to profit himself. In order to please his master he hunted for women in the villages which the company had entered and forcibly dragged them off to his sergeant major. After the nighttime orgies, he would launder the fascist's bestained pants and clean the blood from the sergeant major's uniform. How loathsome!

Thus it was also on Kalmyk soil, in the small town of Yashkul', south of the Stalin-grad front, where the 450th Battalion had been committed to battle against Soviet troops. He fought diligently against the Red Army, in whose ranks the sons of Soviet Turkmenistan also were fighting. In the small town of Yashkul' there are many graves of Soviet soldiers who died the death of the brave from the treacherous bullets of the Turkestan legionnaires, including Murad Tachmurat, whom Hauptmann Kopf, commander of the battalion, was always citing as an example to others.

In May 1943 in the uniform of a noncommissioned officer of the SS with a Swastika on the sleeve and other decorations on his uniform he accompanied Vali Kayum Khan, president of the Turkestan National Committee, himself during his visit to the fascist reconnaissance school in the city of Breslavl' where a special Turkmen SS company was formed. At that time Vali Kayum Khan described Murad Tachmurat to the formation as a real SS man and called on the legionnaires to follow his example. In turn, Murad Tachmurat boastfully described his "services" in battles against the partisans and the Red Army. Of course, at that time he remained silent about his servile efforts to clean sergeant majors' pants.

A month later, now as a member of the Turkestan National Committee, he traveled to Breslavl', on this occasion with the traitor Baymurza Khaitov, and addressed parting words to the Turkestan SS company in which he called on it to smash the "reds" as benefits SS men, ruthlessly and without pity.

...In February-March 1944 our reconnaissance group was given the assignment of breaking through the line of the front and making contact with partisans operating on the Kovel'-Lyuboml' railroad. You can imagine my surprise when I encountered among the Begma partisans three Turkmen who had only just voluntarily crossed over from the Turkestan Legion to the partisans. One of them, Ovezkuli Annamamedov, and I had many acquaintances in common on both sides of the front. He then told me about the perfidy of the fascist stooge Murad Tachmurat, with whom we had studied

at the pedagogical worker faculty. These boys, who subsequently washed away their guilt before the motherland with their blood, told how the legionnaires feared Murad Tachmurat more than the fascist monster Hauptmann Kopf, the commander of the battalion, himself.

In August-September 1944 M. Tachmurat and his gang had already taken to their heels when our division smashed the fascist troops in the city of Volomina and the small towns of Zelenka and Yablone-Legionovo, where we captured many documents pertaining to the Turkestan Legion and prisoners, including Turkestanis. And they said that M. Tachmurat was one of those who was up to his ears in crimes against our people and the friendly Polish people.

At the end of the war he fled to the West and resold himself to Western intelligence. Settling in Munich, M. Tachmurat became an active member of the Turkestan Liberation Committee (TOK) anti-Soviet organization, which had been created from surviving fascist lickspittles.

Immediately after the war, the evil deeds of the Hitlerites were still fresh in the peoples' memory. The founders of the "Turkestan Liberation Committee"--British and American intelligence--attempted in every possible way to conceal the fascist past of their wards and at the same time set as the goal renewing the TOK with new forces by way of the enticement of young people from the ranks of tourists, members of delegations and concert groups traveling abroad from the Central Asian republics. The fraudulent so-called "Youth Union of USSR Peoples in Emigration," which represented no one, was created for this purpose. On an assignment from his masters, Murad Tachmurat scoured the cities of West Europe which had been visited by our people. And, concocting all kinds of fables, he attempted to recruit Soviet tourists, artistes and delegation members for this anti-Soviet "union". But he was fittingly rebuffed on each occasion. He was unable to pull over a single person onto the criminal path of betrayal of the motherland.

Not daring to approach me himself, in 1956 in Switzerland and in 1959 in Rome he sent other emigres, who palmed off onto me emigre ragsheets and magazines containing articles by M. Tachmurat. The fascist protege was attempting to call attention to himself in this way. Look, he was saying, I continue to fight you.

In meetings with other Turkmen tourists he complained that fate had played a cruel trick on him and that he was ready to return to the USSR and that he had committed no crimes against the motherland. And he was lying. In the evening he would go to Radio Liberty, where he worked as an editor and announcer of the Turkmen Department of the Turkestan Desk. He would slander the socialist system in the USSR and the achievements of our Turkmenistan won in the fraternal family of USSR peoples.

I frequently read on my trips overseas such libels of M. Tachmurat in which he distorted the facts.

We naturally considered it beneath our dignity to respond to the traitor's ranting. Let this ideological dog bark somewhere in the West, it is of no consequence to us.

"Let him lie!" I thought at that time. "After all, his libels are read by his masters, those who are paying him. No one else! Let him delude his employers.

Let them amuse themselves with daydreams about the fact that things are going badly in the Central Asian republics. After all, a fascist whose hands are crimson with the blood of Soviet people cannot write any other way."

The fact that we ignored his activity enraged the traitor, and he sought new themes and new moves to get through to us. And at the same time he wished to gain favor with a U.S. CIA employee--the American F. Ronaldson, the director of Radio Liberty. He considered himself to some extent guilty before him since he had been unable to reinforce his desk with young forces. In the Turkmen Department of Radio Liberty's Turkestan Desk he was, as they say, a jack of all trades. Editor, reporter, announcer. And for this reason he displayed a hysterical activeness. First, he had to climb the job ladder and secure the position of, at least, manager of Radio Liberty's Turkestan Desk. For this reason he attempted to squeeze the word "Turkestan" into the headings of apologies for articles as often as possible. He was thinking not in narrow national terms, you see, but on the scale of all Turkestan. Second, as a CIA agent, he had to acquire U.S. citizenship as quickly as possible. As is known, to acquire this citizenship the constitution requires a person to have continuous residence in the United States of 5 years. But he had not lived there for a year even altogether. But he knew that an exception is made for active CIA agents.

And he tried. His quests and new moves and methods were built on lies. Lies and slander were his main tools.

...One time one of our Turkmen journalists, O. Godzhayev, in the FRG as part of a delegation and unaware of M. Tachmurat's criminal past, accepted his invitation and called on him as a fellow countryman. The more readily since they had seen one another earlier in Vienna at the time of the World Youth Festival. O. Godzhayev took his fellow countryman a Turkmen flat-cake loaf--a churek--which had been baked in an earthen oven in Tachmurat's former motherland. He accepted this churek, which was nice and brown and which was redolent of the village, the steppes and the valleys of Turkmenistan, with trembling hands. He looked at it, deciding whether to break a piece off or not. After all, among Turkmen the churek is the supreme arbiter, it is sanctity. One cannot be dishonorable before the churek. He could not take it. And Tachmurat, as if to take a better look at such a precious gift, but in fact to conceal his emotions, turned toward the window. And, finally, he slowly broke off a piece. Right at this moment our journalist asked:

"Murad, be honest: have you committed some crime against the USSR?"

"N-no, I have n-not," M. Tachmurat dithered.

He even lied before the churek.

But this fact recounted by O. Godzhayev on his return from the FRG would, it seemed to me, have prompted this person to reflect. "If just from that time, he would not, perhaps, consent to a crime against his own people," we thought. No. The next day he again went to Munich's Englischer Garten suburb, to a malicious center of ideological sabotage--Radio Liberty--to resume his dirty work. And he is again viciously slandering the holy of holies of his people and their happy life won at a price of tremendous sacrifices.

One further fact of considerable importance. If Tachmurat had not committed crimes as an SS man and if he had not continued to commit such serious crimes while bound hand and foot by his obligations to the U.S. CIA, he would have responded to the appeals of his own mother and father, who addressed him over Radio Rodina. But he left the old parents' appeal unanswered.

And when a person who has betrayed his motherland, his people and his parents speaks on foreign radio with the vile slanders of our literature and art and our writers and artistes, one experiences a revulsion for him. One involuntarily asks: surely this fascist lickspittle understands that there has not been nor could there have been such a development of literature and art here under any other system? After all, he himself was forced to acknowledge this when in a Swiss movie theater at which the Locarno International Film Festival was being held he saw the Turkmen motion picture "The Daughter in Law". The subject of this picture was taken from the life of his very village near Kizyl-Arvat. After the performance, wiping tearful eyes, Tachmurat timidly approached Maya Aymedova and Khodzhakuli Narliyev, who produced this picture, and exclaimed: "The Turkmens have a strong cinema, it appears!"

Nevertheless, even after this, he writes the most complete nonsense about Alty Karliyev, a founder of the Turkmen cinema: the actor's talent would have flourished even more abundantly if the Turkmens lived under a different social system. This is blasphemy! M. Tachmurat sings on Radio Liberty dithyrambs to the talent of USSR People's Actor Aman Kul'mamedov and hereupon unintentionally, as it were, drops a fly into the ointment: this outstanding actor was unable to display his full worth because, you see, he was suppressed by the collective approach to work.

Tachmurat delivered a special broadcast about the work of USSR People's Actor Bazar Amanov. But in tracing his creative path he deliberately glossed over the fact that B. Amanov's talent was shaped under the constant creative assistance of Russian Soviet actors and dramatists, thanks to the best traditions of the multinational Soviet theater and the method of socialist realism, which became the guiding star for his work. Bazar Amanov himself has spoken of this repeatedly and in public. But according to M. Tachmurat, it is the other way about; the actor's work would have assumed a far broader range had he not been forced to abide by the method of socialist realism.

Not has M. Tachmurat overlooked my work. He has attacked my commentary articles and has leaned over backward to whitewash my American opponents.

All M. Tachmurat's radio broadcasts and articles devoted to Turkmenistan's literary and art personalities manifest primarily a dissatisfaction with the fact that we follow the method of socialist realism and sacredly observe the principle of the party-mindedness and popular spirit of literature and art. We are pleased to do this. And we have outstanding achievements on this path. As regards the fact that we abide by the will of the Communist Party, we may answer in M.A. Sholokhov's words: We write at the command of our hearts, and our hearts belong to our party.

Of course, a CIA agent, former SS man and manager of the Turkestan Desk of the espionage-sabotage Radio Liberty, which is hostile to us, will extol neither the socialist realism nor the party-mindedness of literature. This is understandable.

But I have been angered by the fact that this traitor sometimes employs such expressions as "my people," "our people," "our Turkmen art," "our Bazar Amanov," "our Bazar-aga" and so forth. First, what moral right to speak in such a way about the Turkmen people has this renegade when he has betrayed them and sold them out many times?! Second, Bazar Amanov, Alty Karliyev and Aman Kul'namedov would be insulted if they heard that they were being called "my" by an enemy of the people who daily slanders the ideals which they have so proudly and passionately extolled in their work.

...Some frames flashed by on the television screen. Murad Tachmurat broke out into a sweat even. He felt cramped in his apartment. Cramped in this world, although he has a car purchased with the royalties from lies and slander; and the passport of a U.S. citizen obtained in circumvention of the law for special "services" in subversive work against his people. But there is one thing he lacks--a motherland.

He has no motherland! He is rushing around in fear--fear in the face of retribution. And he will rush around with a terrible burden on his back--that of grave crimes. This burden will press down on him more and more, depriving him of emotional peace. Until it crushes him completely. Such is the traitor's lot.

8850

CSO: 1830/23

NATIONAL

BOOK ATTACKS BOURGEOIS 'FALSIFIERS' OF SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 10, Oct 81 p 47

[Review by I. Alekseyev of book "Voprosy teorii i praktiki natsional'nykh otnosheniy v sovremennoy ideologicheskoy bor'be" [Questions of Theory and Practice of National Relations in the Current Ideological Struggle] by A. A. Sazonov, Obshchestvo "Znaniye", 1980, 42 pages]

[Text] The ideological struggle is becoming sharper on the international scene. Our class adversaries are acting more and more impudently and insidiously. Extensively using mass information means, various radio broadcasts, numerous "Soviet specialists" in their ideological subversive activities, they count on nationalism, trying to use it to sow discord among the various nationalities populating our country.

Bourgeois ideologists and revisionist falsifiers direct special efforts at distorting the essence of patriotism and socialist internationalism, friendship of the Soviet peoples, at depicting the CPSU's leading role in realizing the Leninist nationality policy in a distorted manner.

A. A. Sazonov, candidate of historical sciences, convincingly exposes bourgeois falsifiers of the CPSU's Leninist nationality policy and Marxist teachings on nations in his short but comprehensive brochure. He relies on classics of Marxism-Leninism, resolutions of CPSU congresses, numerous documents, figures and facts. He discloses methods for educating workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism.

The brochure is addressed to lecturers. But it can also be quite helpful to journalists studying these important themes.

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CSO: 1800/60

REGIONAL

SECRETARY RISTLAAN CONCERNED WITH PROPAGANDA, COMMUNIST EDUCATION

Tallinn KOMMUNIST ESTONII in Russian No 9, Sep 81 pp 9-16

[Article by Reyn Eduardovich Ristlaan, secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee: "Shaping Communist Conviction"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] As it always has, the CPSU looks upon communist indoctrination of the Soviet people, formation of steadfast ideological convictions in every member of society, as one of its most important tasks. The party's programmatic goals in this effort are indoctrination of the workers in a spirit of high ideals, devotion to the socialist homeland and the cause of communism, and the communist attitude toward work and social property, complete supersedence of bourgeois remnants, the comprehensive and harmonious development of the personality, and the creation of authentic riches of intellectual culture.

The 26th CPSU Congress outlined the strategies for raising the level of the entire ideological and political-educational work in the present stage. Our party's highest forum has worked out a clear line of policy, strategy and tactics for the future advance toward communism. The report address of the CPSU Central Committee thoroughly and critically analyzed all aspects of the party's ideological effort and set the task of reorganizing many of its sections and spheres.

It must be made quite clear to all those who work in the field of ideology that the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress will become a real force determining the course of events only if they are consistently implemented and have a concrete constructive impact on the state of affairs in the particular work collective. It is in this context that the Estonian CP Central Committee evaluates the effectiveness of the ideological effort being conducted among our republic's population.

Ideological Support for Fulfillment of the Tasks of the Economy

The principal direction in the CPSU's entire political-educational effort in this stage is to involve the workers in energetic fulfillment of the new tasks and plans of communist construction advanced by the congress. In this connection our propaganda and agitation have, first, the task of making these plans clear in all aspects and of bringing their content to each individual, and second, of participating directly in carrying out those plans.

In the context of advanced socialism the role of the subjective factor is growing immeasurably because of the intensification of production. Economic performance will now depend more than ever on people's creativity, competence and ethics. Yet these qualities, as we know, are shaped in the process of the ideological effort and political indoctrination. That is why all the party's ideological services should see that progress in the conduct of the CPSU's economic policy is broadly and systematically elucidated. Particular attention should be paid to /popularizing the idea of an economical economy/. The report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress emphasized that our continued advance will depend to an ever greater degree on skillful and effective use of all available resources and the entire productive potential. But this necessitates a new psychological approach to the problems of production and consumption and formation of a true spirit of stewardship in every Soviet person. The recent decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "On Stepping Up the Effort Toward Economy and Optimum Use of Raw-Material, Fuel-and-Energy, and Other Material Resources" issues specific instructions to those working in the ideological field on how to treat the questions of a thrifty attitude toward social property--one of the most important principles of the party's economic strategy.

Our republic's principal economic tasks, as is well known, are the further development of the /fuel chemical and energy complex in the industrial sector and raising the productivity of animal husbandry in agriculture/. Particular attention of ideological workers must naturally be concentrated in these areas. It needs to be said that the Tallin, Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva party gorkoms and primary party organizations of many industrial enterprises have built up valuable experience in furnishing ideological support for the tasks confronting the leading branches of industry, and this know-how needs to be disseminated more widely and utilized by the republic's ideological services. The situation is not as good in rural ideological work. Whereas, for example, the press, radio and television have really been thoroughly concerned with the problems of the "key front in rural areas," we are not yet overindulging livestock raisers with oral propaganda. It is time that our rural party raykoms give serious thought to improving the ideological effort among livestock raisers and to making it a key front--"a key indoctrination front."

Ideological workers in rural rayons should /also give fuller consideration to those changes occurring in the social character of our rural areas under the impact of agroindustrial integration/. It is obvious that the forms and methods of exerting ideological influence on, say, such a compact farm as the "Ranna" Sovkhoz or the Pyarnu Interfarm Industrialized Hog-Raising Operation should differ from the forms used on farms where the production subdivisions and places where people live are widely scattered. Differentiation of the ideological effort among the rural population is taking on particular importance right at this time, when the administration of agriculture in the republic is being restructured and rayon agricultural production associations are being set up. The experience of Vil'yandiskiy and Pyarnuskiy rayons indicates that the reorganization is also resulting in changes in the ideological effort, changes, moreover, which are not always constructive. For example, after the association was set up in Pyarnuskiy Rayon relations between farms and educational institutions

became slack, and material aid to the schools was cut back. And this, of course, cannot be permitted.

/Socialist competition/, on which ideological workers should center their constant attention, has been and remains a potent accelerator of our forward movement in all sectors of the economy. We rightly refer to labor rivalry as the living creativity of the masses. Its enemies are inertia, formalism and ostentatiousness. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed up the need for further development of democratic principles and for the competition to be widely publicized. The level and responsiveness of propaganda are crucial not only to regular information on the course and results of competition, but also to strengthening its creative spirit. The know-how of our best propagandists, who have been extending practical aid to workers in drafting counterplans, socialist obligations and personal conservation accounts, deserves wider dissemination.

But it must be admitted that our propaganda effort is still far from perfection in disseminating and introducing progressive know-how. We seem to have forgotten the further dissemination of such valuable know-how as use of the L'vov product quality control system or the Shchekino method of raising labor productivity, and as yet we are not sufficiently popularizing and revealing the essence of the work-team job contract and attending more than one machine. We are doing little to study our own experience, and we are not doing a good job of disseminating the best achievements of our frontrankers. Which is not to our credit. It is only through /widespread popularization of advance know-how/ that we can really contribute to implementing the party's economic policy.

We have quite a few different forms of competition in which the frontrankers are given material incentives and are commended with challenge banners, pennants and badges. But the presentation of these awards is unfortunately not always sufficiently thought out from the ideological standpoint, nor do they always have the effect of an inspiration on those who participate in these ceremonies. For example, last fall the awards were presented to front-ranking animal husbandrymen of the "Kuldre" Kolkhoz in Vyrukskiy Rayon in an unheated clubhouse that had not been cleaned up. Ceremonies like that, if they deserve the term, do more harm than good. Unfortunately, this is far from an isolated example. There are even cases when the honoring of labor frontrankers is accompanied, to put it crudely, by a drinking bout. Of course, there can be no indoctrinating benefit whatsoever when the "results are totaled up" in this way. The ideological workers of party committees and primary party organizations must prepare more thoroughly for honoring the winners in socialist competition and must turn this event into a true labor holiday.

Inertia, traditions and habit formed in our consciousness back in the period when only quantitative indicators of production were emphasized are among the principal factors holding our economy back from a further rise. This inertia needs to be overcome, and an efficiently operating /system of economic education/ should play an important role here.

The republic now has more than 300,000 persons studying the problems of the efficiency of labor and advanced production know-how. The only pity is that in

the workshops in economics schools the propagandists are still paying little attention to the practical solution of economic problems, though it is their analysis that ought to serve as the principal method of economics instruction. It is indispensable to combine concern about raising the level of the knowledge of economics with instilling in people a love for work, a feeling of responsibility, and a stewardly attitude toward social property. There is a need for all departments concerned with setting up economics education and also party gorkoms and raykoms to be more persistent in improving this important form for popularizing the party's economic policy.

A more vigorous battle should be waged to /strengthen work discipline, planning discipline and state discipline/. Public opinion should be turned sharply against shirkers and other violators of discipline, overpermissiveness should be eradicated, and every worker should realize with maximum clarity that his well-being and status in the collective depend solely on the results of his personal work contribution. The formula--whoever wants to live better must do more work and better work--should become one of the prevailing principles of our entire agitation and propaganda effort.

Strengthening the Material and Nonmaterial Foundations of Shaping the New Man

A typical feature of our country's present stage of development is the very close interrelationship among economic progress, social and political progress and nonmaterial progress. That is why further development of our society's social, class and ethnic structure is an object of the party's great concern.

The ideological work related to carrying out the party's social policy is no simple matter. In this area all the shifts that have taken place in the social structure of society and in social relations need to be strictly taken into account. We need to emphasize with particular force that all the assessments, conclusions and recommendations on the complex problems of class relations and relations among the nationalities must correspond precisely to the basic propositions contained in the documents of the party, decisions of CPSU congresses, and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. In this area there are to be absolutely no inaccuracies, extremes or distortions whatsoever.

The congress' conclusion to the effect that the emergence of the classless structure of society will mainly take place even within the historical limits of mature socialism has extremely fundamental importance. The working class, whose revolutionary ideology and morality, whose interests and ideals are now becoming the property of all strata of our society, has been and remains at the center of this process, in which it is the driving force. Throughout the entire agitation and propaganda effort at the present time, then, closer attention needs to be paid to disseminating the advanced ideas of the working class and to extending its influence to all other groups and strata of society.

Problems related to the further erasure of differences in the social position of workers and peasants should occupy a large place in the activity of party organizations, in rural areas particularly. As we know, we have progressed a relatively long way on the road toward overcoming differences between urban and

rural areas, specifically in the level of the equipment-labor ratio and social-welfare, cultural and consumer services. Further practical steps need to be taken in that direction, and the importance of this major social achievement needs to be widely explained and popularized.

The people's intelligentsia is playing an increasingly important role in the entire life of society. Its numbers are growing rapidly. We need to emphasize in our everyday propaganda that the CPSU's course toward an all-out strengthening of the alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia meets the objective needs of social development.

In the ideological effort we must pay attention not only to interclass relations, but also to intraclass and other differences reflecting our specific regional pattern and the peculiarities and interests of every social group in society, for example, of young people, of women, of retired persons, and so on. Only in that way will we guarantee still greater strengthening of the political-ideological, social and multinational solidarity of our society and its further advance toward social homogeneity.

Great and fundamental importance was attributed at the party's congress to further strengthening of the /friendship of the peoples of our homeland/. Consistent implementation of the party's Leninist nationality policy is conducive in every way to the flowering of every Soviet nationality and to augmentation of its material and nonmaterial potential. At the same time, the intensive economic and social development of all our country's nationalities and ethnic minorities is speeding up the process of their convergence in every way and of multinationalization of all aspects of the life of Soviet society. The unity of the Soviet nationalities is today stronger than ever before, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in the report address to the 26th party congress. This is one of the greatest social achievements of the Soviet system, one which we have a duty to preserve and augment with the greatest care. That is why the party is waging a determined struggle against all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, whatever form they might take. Their remnants, though they are in principle alien to the nature of socialism, have still been preserved in the consciousness of certain people, since overcoming all ethnic prejudices and differences between nationalities takes a long time.

To force the objective process of convergence of the nationalities in an artificial way could be detrimental to the strengthening of the friendship of peoples. But the other extreme, manifested in exaggeration of ethnic peculiarities and setting them in opposition to the common cause which unites all socialist nationalities, is equally harmful. That is why the formation of internationalist attributes in our people, instilling in them a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, has occupied and will occupy a most important place in the party's ideological effort. /Our entire party political effort must be imbued with the spirit of socialist internationalism/.

An analysis of the status of internationalist indoctrination in the republic shows that unfortunately our system for shaping internationalist convictions in all members of society without exception is operating ineffectively as yet.

Often we limit ourselves only to general appeals for improved indoctrination of people in a spirit of the friendship of peoples or we perform isolated measures in that direction without covering the entire interrelated set of problems. The comprehensive plan of measures which the Estonian CP Central Committee adopted early this year is a serious attempt to work out an extensive system for improving internationalist indoctrination. Efforts by all party workers, personnel in the field of ideology above all, are now indispensable to realizing what was outlined in it. Accordingly, the moral aspects of the friendship of people should be an object of particular attention: mutual assistance in work and everyday life, respect for the best ethnic traditions of all the Soviet peoples, and a sense of their dignity as a nationality.

The foundations of communist morality, which encompass the foundations of internationalism as well, are laid at an early age. The social indoctrination of the citizens of our country, as is well known, begins even in kindergarten. Yet we have to admit that we are still underestimating the importance of this stage in shaping the personality and are doing little to indoctrinate internationalist sentiments in children. It is the duty of party committees and the ministry of education to take steps to improve the way internationalist indoctrination is organized in children's preschool institutions.

This work must be continued and elaborated in the schools. Only by observing continuity and consistency in this effort will we be able to meet the party's requirement concerning a comprehensive approach to bringing up young people. Unfortunately, we cannot say at present that we have been fully successful in this. In recent years we have had cases now in one school, now in another, that indicate serious shortcomings in internationalist indoctrination. Party gorkoms and raykoms, Komsomol committees, and the authorities of public education must improve this effort among young people in the schools in a most resolute way.

/Military-patriotic indoctrination/ plays an exceptional role in establishing the ideas of the friendship of peoples in the consciousness of the young generation. One cannot overestimate the strength of the moral impact exerted on young people by, say, the discovery by Vyru Komsomol members and Pioneers of more than 2,600 names of soldiers who fell in the years of World War II within that rayon and their correspondence with relatives living in various parts of our country of 600 of those who died. Solemn ceremonies on the glorious anniversaries of our homeland and the armed forces make a deep impression on young people. We will recall only the most recent of them--the opening of the All-Union Memorial Watch in our republic last April. The everyday contacts which young boys and girls have with our soldiers and the specific work organized with the public by the political arms of military units and formations, and war veterans have a very great political impact on them.

But we cannot stop with what we have achieved. Especially since some draftees have been poorly prepared for service in the armed forces and since there are still not many young men of Estonian nationality choosing to be career officers. These and certain other facts are evidence that quite a bit of effort still needs to be applied to improve military-patriotic indoctrination.

By revealing the tremendous achievements of our system in the social and nonmaterial spheres, workers on the ideological front must look at things soberly, must portray life as it is, including its subjective contradictions, difficulties and shortcomings. A widespread struggle needs to be organized against /such adverse manifestations/ as egoism and narrow-mindedness, moneygrubbing, bureaucracy, indifference to the people's concerns and affairs, parasitism, bribery and drunkenness. It must be said that our republic newspapers RAKHVA KHYAEL' and SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA have recently become more actively involved in this struggle, but the other mass information and propaganda media, especially city and rayon newspapers, have been very slow to follow their example. Party gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations are not sufficiently concerned with these matters.

The struggle against adverse manifestations needs to be waged persistently, consistently, concretely, and straightforwardly, naming the names of those who violate the rules of socialist intercourse. At the same time another aspect of the problem should not be forgotten--/shaping reasonable needs in people/--the ability to measure the amount of goods to be consumed against the contribution they make by their own work. This necessitates that the propaganda effort be energetic and set forth the problem in a competent and scientifically sound way.

While paying greater attention to the problems of Soviet society's social and nonmaterial development, ideological workers have a right to count on more effective help from the republic's scientists, social scientists above all. The critical analysis of the development of the /social sciences/ made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the report address at the party congress applies altogether to the state of affairs in our republic. Our social scientists are not doing enough to study the new phenomena of life and are paying too much attention to individual and sometimes trivial aspects of the historical process, bypassing the principal questions of the social life of contemporary society. For example, in the history departments of Tartu State University there are 17 scientists, 4 with doctor's degrees and 10 with candidate's degrees. This staff of scientists could be effectively engaged in research on the patterns of development of socialist society. But these scientists are studying only the history of agrarian relations in the era of feudalism and capitalism, the relations between man and nature shaped by history, and the role of Tartu University as a scientific and cultural center. A heightened interest exclusively in the problems of the remote past, disassociation from life, and the random and nontopical nature of many research subjects are also typical of certain other scientific institutions. Our scientists need to link research in the social sciences more closely to the work of Soviet, economic and ideological organizations and to thoroughly and comprehensively analyze present-day socioeconomic processes. For their part party authorities and all ideological institutions and workers need to show greater interest in the results of the most recent research in the social sciences and use them in planning and actual performance of party political work.

A large step forward was taken in the seventies in development of /public education/--the transition was made to universal compulsory secondary education. Now the task of raising the quality of teaching and training and of a further

strengthening of the school's relations with life is moving into the foreground. Formalism needs to be eradicated in assessment of the performance of teachers and students, and the training of schoolchildren for socially useful work is in need of serious improvement.

It was emphasized at the party congress that the /teacher/, who needs to be surrounded by particular concern, has a decisive role to play in improving teaching and communist indoctrination of the adolescent generation. But the demand of the congress is being met poorly in the republic as yet, particularly as concerns teachers' needs for housing and consumer services. In Tallin and Tartu, in Pylvaskiy, Valgaskiy and Khaapsaluskiy rayons few apartments have been allocated to teachers. In many cities and rayons the schools' plant and equipment is inadequate. It should be repeated once again that /unless public education receives important material and moral help, high results in academic work and indoctrination cannot be expected/. Party gorkoms and raykoms need to take this into account in their work.

Along with concern about improving the working and living conditions of teachers, about raising their ideological-political level and qualifications, party and Soviet authorities and public education divisions have a responsibility to increase the effectiveness of the indoctrination effort directly among secondary students and strengthen the party's influence in Komsomol organizations and organizations of secondary students. In this connection the leisure time of children and adolescents should be filled in a better way, and the public should monitor more effectively the content of their leisure.

In recent years the bulk of university students in the republic have had greater academic success and have become more active in civic affairs. But there is reason for concern because various legal offenses and antisocial acts committed by university students have stayed at the same level. This means that some VUZ young people are still dropping out of the range of effect of our indoctrination. But often university students are left to themselves in the time not spent in class, their leisure time is poorly organized, and even elementary order is lacking in many dormitories. The republic's ministry of higher and secondary specialized education and VUZ rectorates and party committees ultimately need to take effective measures to bring order into student dormitories and to make them centers of a well-structured political and cultural-educational effort.

/Literature and art/ occupy an important place in the party's ideological activity. The level of creativity of our republic's writers and artists has risen noticeably in the recent past; on the whole it is truthfully portraying the most important problems of the day and is helping to establish communist ideals in the consciousness of the broad masses of people. Nevertheless, certain manifestations in our republic's literature and art are disturbing. A certain portion of the artistic intelligentsia has removed itself from civic life and is concerned with self-analysis and the examination of subjective experiences and pseudoproblems. In literary and artistic creativity we sometimes observe manifestations of snobbism and neglect of the popular nature of Soviet culture and even a certain social pessimism.

At the 26th CPSU Congress it was emphasized anew that the party has not been and cannot be indifferent to the ideological orientation of our art. It is indispensable, therefore, to resolutely /strengthen the influence of the party among the creative intelligentsia/. This central task is above all the duty of leaders and primary party organizations of the creative unions themselves, and they have a responsibility to advocate implementation of the party's principles in the front line. The members of creative collectives need to be inoculated with the attributes of fighters, criticism and self-criticism in party spirit needs to be invigorated most seriously among them, public opinion based on principle needs to be created concerning certain immature works and erroneous tendencies and manifestations in creative life. All need to be told frankly and clearly what party members are supporting and what they are rejecting. This, of course, does not signify an infringement on the freedom of creation; on the contrary, this is true concern about the development of talent, since if the errors are played down, they will be repeated and will become worse.

Examination of the development of literature and art not uncommonly leads to the conclusion that /the republic agencies and their party organizations/ which have a duty to guide cultural life are frequently not concerned with guiding the process of creation of spiritual values, but only with recording its results. Of course, artistic creativity does develop according to its own internal laws, and it is absolutely impermissible to take an administrative attitude here. But by no means is this equivalent to renunciation of government guidance of this sphere. The point is that specific means, a special tact and precision are needed in approaching the solution of creative problems.

Can it be said, for example, that the republic's ministry of culture is exerting a vigorous impact on shaping the repertoire of theaters? Hardly, more often than not its role is limited to recording the proposals that come in from the theaters. Multiannual repertoire plans are not even drawn up. Sometimes the ministry's representatives show laxity concerning the ideological-artistic level of productions, and as a consequence plays are put on which have a muddy ideological conception.

It is, of course, the theaters themselves that should be concerned about the high ideological-artistic level of productions. But this presupposes that the ministry of culture is working regularly with the key personnel of the theaters, though it is not seriously concerned with this.

Nor is the situation better in the republic's state film committee, which has not shown the necessary vigor and persistence in organizing an influx of scripts on the topical subjects of the present time. And if we also add that in certain stages of the work on films the state committee is not exercising the requisite oversight and often is lax in the demands it makes on the finished product, then it is not surprising that the ideological-artistic level of certain films is just as low as before.

/Nor do party gorkoms and raykoms/ have a right to stand aloof from solving the problems of literature and art. Their field of vision must always include such matters as the purposive esthetic training of the workers, especially young

people, their introduction to spiritual values, the political self-education of the artistic intelligentsia, the maintenance and strengthening of the plant and equipment of cultural institutions, and the development of the relations of patronage between creative and work collectives. It is gratifying that cultural life has recently become noticeably more active in Tartu and in Khaapsaluskiy and Pylvaskiy rayons, but as yet this has not been observed everywhere by any means.

Recently the Estonian CP Central Committee approved a detailed plan of measures to step up the effort among the artistic intelligentsia. It is the duty of all party organs and ideological institutions to guarantee its successful implementation.

Stepping Up the Effort To Popularize the Peaceful Foreign Policy of the CPSU

A most important aspect of agitation and propaganda activity is to constantly explain to our people the course of foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the fact that in conformity with Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence it is aimed at strengthening the unity of the world socialist system, at strengthening its alliance with the national liberation movement, and at developing mutual advantageous cooperation with the capitalist states. There is a particular need to thoroughly reveal the nature of those efforts which our party and state are undertaking to remove the threat of war, to restrain the arms race, and to preserve and deepen detente. Foreign political figures have good reason to refer to the proposals which Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev made at the 26th party congress as a "eight-point program of a peace offensive." The efforts of our ideological services must be aimed at elucidating every aspect of these initiatives.

In assessing the practice of informing the population of Estonian SSR concerning the foreign policy activity of the party and concerning events in international life we need to say that quite a bit is being done to that end. We have been receiving a great deal of help from the central press and especially the central television, whose foreign policy broadcasts have been very popular with a wide audience. Estonian radio and television and our newspapers and magazines show competence in commenting on foreign policy affairs. On the whole the day-to-day effort to inform the population orally about events in foreign policy has not been badly organized. But this is only true of the day-to-day effort. Responsiveness is undoubtedly a valuable attribute of oral propaganda, but sometimes this detracts from the depth of the analysis of the international situation, and the sociopolitical content of events taking place in the world is not revealed fully enough. It is important to demonstrate the basic position of the CPSU and Soviet state concerning these events, and haste has no place in that.

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the influence of the ideology of imperialism and the power and effectiveness of its propaganda apparatus. That is why counterpropaganda and exposing the treacherous methods of ideological opponents should occupy its due place in our indoctrinational activity.

On the whole the republic's ideological workers are well informed about the activity of the principal centers of hostile propaganda which are conducting psychological warfare against us in the full sense of the word. But we need a more effective coordination of counterpropaganda; gorkoms and raykoms must always be studying public opinion, must have a better knowledge of the situation in work collectives, and must work regularly with the activists so that when necessary any ideological worker can offer resolute resistance to the intrigues of hostile propaganda centers.

The appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the parliaments and peoples of the world was another bright landmark along the way of implementing the extensive peace program for the eighties advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress; that appeal emphasized: "Safeguarding the peace has been, is and will remain the supreme goal of the foreign policy of the Soviet state." The appeal and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, imposed on workers on the ideological front the duty to reveal still more vividly the sources and nature of the peaceful foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

Improving the Ideological and Political-Indoctrination Effort

The party regards it as its constant duty to instill a high level of awareness in the workers, to form in them the scientific outlook, and to inculcate in them a desire to participate actively in building communism. That is why political work with the broad masses of people occupies a most important place in the ideological activity of the CPSU. Relying on Leninist principles of the dissemination of ideas and its Bolshevik traditions, in our ideological and political-indoctrination effort we should take into account all the new phenomena and changes in the life of our society and in the international arena. Proceeding from the principles of the 26th party congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee dated 26 April 1979, there are three basic points that should be borne in mind in the further restructuring of the ideological effort.

First, /improving the content of propaganda and agitation/. It must be more up to date, it must be in line with the urgent tasks of party policy and with people's interests. The workers should punctually receive scientifically sound and documented answers to all the questions that disturb them. An open and constructive discussion of the fateful problems of social life needs to be conducted by all the means of disseminating ideas, and regular appearances before the workers by leading party, soviet and economic officials should be organized.

Second, /improvement of the forms and methods of propaganda and agitation/. It is very important to replace in good time the outdated forms and methods and to get rid of clichés and set patterns. This is no easy task; it requires great efforts by all ideological workers. The new forms of propaganda work do not have to be invented or created artificially; they should be looked for in life itself, in the practice of ideological work. It is important that the new forms of our propaganda be attractive to people and develop their civic activity. In the search for new solutions, then, more vigorous use should be made of experience that has been gained and the valuable initiatives of party organizations and ideological workers and the achievements of the social sciences.

Third, /improvement of the style of party guidance of the ideological effort/. It is quite clear that such tried and true methods of party guidance as selection, assignment and training of personnel, comprehensive planning and coordination of ideological work, and monitoring progress in carrying out the decisions which have been taken have by no means lost their importance. On the contrary, their role should grow constantly. But at the same time there is a need to involve in the ideological effort /all/ party, soviet and economic personnel and to make better use of the potential that exists for making the party's economic and social decisions clear to the public. There is a need to be thoroughly aware of the simple truth that there is not a single intraparty or economic issue which does not have its ideological aspect. That is why not a single party member should stand aloof from ideological work.

Further enhancement of the role of propaganda and agitation in the life of society needs to be achieved by improving the style of party guidance of the ideological effort, and a more offensive and militant character should be imparted to them.

We will go on to examine certain specific problems arising out of the restructuring of the ideological effort that is now going on.

It is natural that as we move forward in building the new society the tasks of the /mass information and propaganda media/ become more complicated and ramified. They now possess a strong physical capability that makes it possible to bring the party's living word to every person without exception.

Newspapers and magazines are publishing and radio and television are broadcasting quite a few meaningful pieces in which current problems are thoroughly analyzed. Newspapermen see the main road for making their articles more effective in the skillful popularization of our achievements, advanced know-how and superior examples. At the same time they present for the judgment of the community oversights and shortcomings, and they fight for the new to become established in our life. This is the pattern of operation, for example, of the editors of the newspapers RAKHVA KHYAEL', SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, PYARNU KOMMUNIST and certain others.

But by no means are we satisfied with the content and form of presentation of every piece that appears in the press or on radio and television. What are the principal shortcomings of our journalism?

First of all, articles and broadcasts do not always carry a sufficient ideological burden; a clear class-oriented and party position is not duly manifested in them. Meanwhile there should be no articles in our press whose content is such that one does not know what the author is getting at, what sort of idea he is disseminating. But in the drive for cheap popularity certain journalists even approve of petty bourgeois attitudes and tastes. There are editors who allow in the pages of the publications entrusted to them pieces that glorify the "good old times," or, still worse, expressions alien to our outlook. Directors of the mass media must display a strict devotion to principle. Every piece published in the Soviet press, even if its purpose is to divert, must carry an ideological charge!

There is a particular need for discussion of criticism in the press. It is quite natural that it must speak openly about the difficulties, the unsolved problems and shortcomings, that it wage an implacable fight against adverse phenomena in our life. In future we must continue to follow that line, to offer fierce resistance to any attempts at throttling criticism, to maintain its strict consistency, but at the same time every piece of criticism should be specifically addressed: In the Soviet press there is no place, nor can there be, for abstract scattering of shots and for irony that is not specifically addressed.

Another shortcoming is laxity concerning the style and language of newspaper articles and radio and television broadcasts. It is important to get rid of meaningless blathering, banal language, clichés and insipid material as quickly as possible. A broad innovative exploration is needed in the domain of style so that it meets people's higher cultural and educational level. There is a need for an integrated system of organizational measures, for an indoctrinational effort with journalists, for improvement of the qualifications of all personnel who have to do with the camera, the microphone or the pen. There is also a need to be bold in promoting and supplying incentives--both moral and material--to gifted journalists who are leaders in the creative search for new and more effective forms of party propaganda. This is what the party requires of journalists--after all, articles in the press and radio and television programs are worth little if they do not reach the minds and hearts of the audience, if the newspapers and magazines go unread, if the television set or radio is turned off.

And finally, our mass information and propaganda media unfortunately still are making mistakes and indeed even distorting the facts. This is indicative of the low standards in certain editorial offices and of a superficial and irresponsible attitude taken by individual journalists toward their duty. They all know perfectly well that even the slightest error or inaccuracy in the press can result in a serious ideological defeat. The directors and party organizations of the mass media must be more exacting toward the quality of articles and broadcasts and must eradicate unconscientiousness and careless indifference.

The inexhaustible capabilities of the press, television and radio can be fully revealed only when this has been capably facilitated by /party guidance/ and the constant support of party committees. But a number of party gorkoms and raykoms guide their press organs superficially, formally, on an ad hoc basis. For example, the Narva Gorkom and the Rakvereskiy, Vil'yandiskiy and Khar'yuskiy raykoms did not take up the work of their newspaper even a single time in a session of the bureau during the entire past year. Our VUZ newspapers are also cooking in their own juice, and their editing and the planning of their work are in some places left entirely to the students themselves. Is there any reason to be surprised, then, when all kinds of lapses are encountered in these papers? The performance of the editorial boards of certain newspapers and magazines is also unsatisfactory, and our creative unions are providing poor guidance to their publications.

It is self-evident that when editors raise the acute problems that disturb people they have a right to count on the full-fledged aid and support of party

organs. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. The newspaper LENINLIK LIPP, for example, conducted a series of unannounced inspections in trade enterprises and presented the results in a critical way in its pages. But the Kokhtla-Yarve party gorkom did not support this important and necessary initiative by the editors. The newspaper YKHTULEKHT, in printing the responses of officials of the Tallin Gorispolkom concerning measures taken according to a newspaper article, which in actuality were incorrect, has more than once been embarrassed before its readership. But the Tallin party gorkom has still not issued a scrupulous analysis of these facts. It is time to put an end to the formal and indifferent attitude toward critical articles in the press.

/Party education/ is in need of further improvement. Along with examples of the creative organization of party education the 26th CPSU Congress also pointed to certain shortcomings in it. The principal ones were formalism and an insufficient relation between classes in theory and the contemporary scene. These shortcomings also occur in our community. A check on the status of education in the Tallin party organization revealed that in such collectives as the Tallin Taxicab Fleet, the fruit and vegetable market, the sailing center, the republic restaurant administration, and certain others many classes did not meet at all, and some of them consisted only of the propagandist's monologue before passive listeners.

Often the reason for such a situation is that there are not enough highly qualified propagandists who like their work because the number of students in the party education network has increased rapidly (mostly activists who are not members of the party). It is at the same time well known that the principal task of party education lies in the ideological hardening of party members and of leader cadres in particular. There is no question, of course, of a blanket and mechanical removal of nonparty members from the network of political training, but of a certain regulation of those who attend in order to organize regular and thorough study of the party's theory and policy by every party member. There is a need to make a resolute change of direction toward increasing the quality of party education--that is the principal demand that follows from the recent decree of the CPSU Central Committee entitled "On Further Improvement of Party Education in the Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress."

/Mass political work/ is in need of basic restructuring. One of its main directions is to set up a differentiated system of political propaganda which would furnish the broad masses of people systematic knowledge on the most important aspects of party policy on a regular basis. To that end gorkoms and raykoms should pay more attention to schools of communist labor as the educational form involving the largest number of workers, should expand in every way the network of people's universities, and should include more political disciplines in their curriculum.

An important direction in those forms of political indoctrination that reach a mass worker audience is the system of /political information and agitation, lectures and talks/. We have organized this system on a rather broad scale. But here the question arises: Are we not striving solely for quantitative indicators, deceiving ourselves with an appearance of everything being as it should?

This spring the Estonian CP Central Committee checked the work of the Khaapsa-luskiy party raykom in popularizing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. It turned out that in 1.5 months more than 1,000 lectures were delivered in the work collective of the rayon by lecturers of the Znaniye Society. In actuality, as was revealed by conversations with those who heard them, the quality of some of the lectures was so low that no one even remembered them, and some of the presentations, to put it simply, never even occurred. The padding of figures on the lecture effort--this, now, is something out of the ordinary. We need to be resolute in eradicating such cases and to reorganize mass political work on a sound basis, according to the Leninist principle: "Better less, provided it is better!"

/Unified political days/, which every month involve more than half of the employed population and most work collectives, are a form of mass political work that has highly recommended itself.

But even this successful form of operation, which has become popular, is in need of improvement. In future there should be more thorough analysis of the questions put to the speakers, and answers must unfailingly be made afterwards to those questions which could not be answered at once. More thorough preparation should be made for upcoming political days, speakers should be selected more thoughtfully, and these days should be conducted first of all in those places where more acute issues have accumulated and where the workers are less well informed. Political days need to be held more frequently in small work collectives, since as a rule it is there that the influence of party members is less perceptible. An unsatisfactory situation has come about, for example, in the Leninskiy Rayon in Tallin, where political days have not been held at all in more than 40 of the 92 small work collectives. Leading officials of Tallin and Tartu and of the capital's Oktyabr'skiy and Morskiy rayons, it turns out, have avoided speaking to university student audiences on political days. Isn't this the reason why such an important form of mass political work has so far not become established as it should in VUZ's?

Political work with the masses should not, of course, be restricted solely to work collectives; it also needs to be conducted according to where people live. But why are political days organized so timidly in city microareas and in rural settlements? I suppose that progress will be made if the local soviets tackle them seriously.

Much in the mass agitation effort depends on /cultural and educational institutions/ and on amateur organizations of individuals. If the work of such traditional collectives as choruses and orchestras, people's theaters and dance ensembles is on the whole well organized, we have clearly been little concerned with clubs and sections to meet special interests. The republic trade union council and ministry of culture have still not provided sufficient coordination or guidance to their activity. There is a need to improve the operating conditions of special interest clubs and to give them the necessary ideological orientation. The numerous vocal and instrumental ensembles, which at present are left to themselves for all practical purposes, are in need of more aid, guidance and oversight.

The contribution of the republic's /athletic organizations/ to people's communist indoctrination is not weighty enough as yet. Though recently the mass athletic movement has been invigorated in our republic, only the first steps have been taken in that direction. Only if the ministry of education and the committee for physical education and athletics manage to reestablish a broad system of school athletic competitions and its concern about supreme athletic skill is pushed into the background will the mass movement for physical fitness be able to count on success in the physical training of the population.

Party gorkoms and raykoms need to be more exacting toward athletic and youth organizations and to see that one of the principal issues of our future--people's health--is under their unstinting supervision.

In the present situation of exacerbation of the ideological struggle it is important to improve /atheistic indoctrination/. Whereas over the last 5 years there has been a sizable reduction in the number of members of organized religions in the republic, there has been a slight increase in the share of young people belonging to religious societies, which is, of course, a sign of low effectiveness of our atheistic propaganda. Some churchgoers have begun to display greater activity and to resort even to actions forbidden by Soviet laws. Certain persons are attempting to use various meetings and summer camps of religious organizations to propagandize views alien to us. That is why we need to make our atheistic propaganda more aggressive and militant and improve its content.

Improvement of the style of party guidance of the ideological effort presupposes /further enhancement of the role of the party committee as the organ for political leadership of organizations carrying on the ideological effort and political indoctrination/. It is the party committee that should figure as the principal center coordinating the activity of ideological services and uniting the efforts of all means of propaganda and agitation. Unfortunately, not all party committees are coping with this task at present. Certain divisions of party gorkoms and raykoms and also the economic entities they guide are not always showing due attention and interest in the problems of ideological indoctrination, forgetting that there are no purely economic issues whose solutions would not have consequences to indoctrination. Every problem can be solved only when there is close unity and interrelationship between organizational and propaganda activity, which are the basis of guidance of the ideological effort as a whole.

We have seen the formation of notable ideological cadres in recent years, but life is moving on and imposing ever newer and higher demands on them. That is why party committees need to do a great deal of serious work to indoctrinate, teach and retrain ideological cadres, especially at the lower level. Closer attention should once again be paid by party committees to the need for improving the organization of instruction of deputy secretaries of party organizations for the ideological effort, political information officers, agitators and other activists. Ideological-political work cannot be done by people who are incompetent, who have been poorly trained, and especially by people who are indifferent. Their thorough knowledge of their work and their interest must be organically combined with a feeling for the new and a creative attitude toward their job.

It is an important mission of the ideological activ of the party to mobilize all the workers in implementing the plans of the 26th CPSU Congress. What does this require? It requires, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech at the opening of the 26th party congress: "First of all--a high sense of responsibility and firm, truly communist and conscious discipline. Equally necessary, of course, are inspired ideas, an unstinting search for the new, and support for those new things. There is a need for constant initiative--initiative everywhere and with respect to all things."

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REGIONAL

BRONSHTEYN ASSESSES ESTONIAN FOOD PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 1, 2 Sep 81

[Serialized article by M. Bronshteyn, corresponding member of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the ESSR Academy of Sciences Commission for Economic and Social Problems of the Development of the Republic Agrarian-Industrial Complex: "The Food Program. Problems, Solutions"]

[1 Sep 81 pp 1-2]

[Text] 1. Within as Short a Time as Possible

The 26th CPSU Congress deemed it necessary to solve the food problem within as short a time as possible. For this purpose a special food program is being drawn up which is to secure a considerable increase in agricultural production.

The content of the food problem differs at different stages of historical development. There was a time when it was necessary to secure at any price a bare subsistence minimum consumption of food, primarily bread.

At the current stage the food problem has two aspects: 1) ensuring the consumption of food in the best structure in accordance with scientifically substantiated norms; and 2) normalizing the food market--ensuring uninterrupted supplies to the population in all areas of the country.

Is it possible to remove comparatively quickly the shortage which has come about and to balance the supply of and demand for valuable food products? This could be done in purely economic fashion, for example, by raising the commission prices in state trade to the level of market prices. But the outward economic gain could prove a social loss--an appreciable drop in the living standard and consumption primarily of the less well-off strata if it were not compensated by a growth of monetary income. Such is the real contradiction.

The way to the solution of the food problem was charted by the 26th CPSU Congress. Its basis is a further upsurge in agriculture. The first task is to raise the production of the products the shortage of which is giving rise to particularly noticeable interruptions in supply--primarily meat and other animal husbandry products. Whereas the overall increase in the agricultural product is scheduled to amount to 12-14 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan, the increase in meat production is planned at 20 percent. And this is the minimum. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress also determine the main tasks confronting our republic's agriculture in the long term.

The Estonian SSR is a republic with a comparatively highly intensive level of agriculture specializing predominantly in dairy and meat animal husbandry and can and must make a considerable contribution to the solution of the food problem. As is known, the production of meat, dairy products and eggs per capita is considerably higher here than for the country. The consumption level is higher also. It is close to the scientifically substantiated level for animal husbandry products (the latter is also somewhat higher for the ESSR than the union average).

The ESSR, like the other union republics, functions within the framework of the union division of labor, obtaining from other republics necessary industrial and agricultural products, including a considerable amount of grain (up to one-half) as a feed resource for the development of animal husbandry. We would note, incidentally, that in Hungary, where annual meat production constitutes approximately 140 kilos per capita, 75 kilos are consumed inside the country. The remainder goes for foreign exchange. We, producing up to 130 kilos, supply approximately one-third of the meat product to others.

The ESSR has definite possibilities for a further increase in the production of animal husbandry products for the purpose of an increase both in internal consumption and interrepublic exchange. We have yet to make full use of our natural potential and accumulated experience of the production of relatively inexpensive animal husbandry products. According to the directives of the 26th CPSU Congress for the 11th Five-Year Plan, agricultural output is to increase 11-13 percent in the ESSR.

Less than 12 percent of the able-bodied population is currently employed in the republic's agriculture. This percentage is almost twice as low as the average for the country. And, according to available forecasts, the proportion of persons employed in the republic's agriculture will show a constant decline. It is asked: how is it, then, that the United States, where approximately 3 percent of the able-bodied population is employed in agriculture, produces a perfectly sufficient quantity of food? This figure is, incidentally, not entirely correct: it does not take account of the so-called tillers [dillery] who in fact perform the field work. But this is not the main point. In the estimation of American scientists themselves, the soil-climatic potential of U.S. agriculture is 2.5 times higher than in the Soviet Union and 60 percent of the cultivated land is situated in zones with optimum (high soil fertility and sufficient warmth and moisture) natural conditions for agriculture. Such land constitutes only 1 percent in the Soviet Union. And, of course, does not include the ESSR. The differences in the power-worker and capital-worker ratios are even more appreciable. There is 7.3 times more power capacity per individual employed in agriculture in the United States than in our country. Furthermore, for one worker employed directly in U.S. agriculture there are three in other spheres of the agrarian-industrial (food) complex--production of producer goods for agriculture, agricultural services and the processing and shipment of products. In the Soviet Union this correlation is approximately one to one. Whence the unduly great expenditure of live labor--approximately 16-17 million persons (of the 26 million working in the Soviet Union's agriculture) were until recently employed predominantly in manual labor.

For this reason the main path of the country's agricultural development consists of its further intensification and consistent transition to a machine-industrial footing. The general policy of the consistent intensification and industrialization

of agricultural production as the main means of the solution of the food problem is the basis of the CPSU's current agrarian policy.

2. The Main Thing--the Efficiency of Agricultural Production

Any real economic task, even the most complex, is feasible--it just needs resources and time. Growing requirements are hurrying time along--it is essential to solve the food problem in its qualitative-structural aspect in the immediate 5-year plans. But here we encounter primarily limitations pertaining to resources. The food program is one of the most capital-intensive. In the estimation of American specialists, at the corresponding stage of development a unit of increase in agricultural output in the United States required an increase of 2 units of investment in means of the mechanization and 5 units in the chemicalization of agriculture. Following the CPSU Central Committee March (1965) Plenum, our country has proceeded toward a considerable redistribution of capital investments in favor of agriculture, increasing its proportion to 27 percent of total investments in the economy. This proportion can hardly be increased in the future. We are confronted with an urgent need for a considerable increase in investments for the solution of other, extremely important and capital-intensive economic programs--power engineering, raw material, machine-building, transportation, housing and so forth. We would note, incidentally, that investments of funds in our republic's agriculture have been stabilized in recent years at an average annual level close to that of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. And this trend will be maintained in the future.

For this reason the rate of development and time of the solution of the food problem now depend more than ever before on the efficiency of capital investments in agriculture, on their actual returns and on the best use of the natural-economic potential available. And here we encounter negative trends toward a decline in the output-capital ratio. Thus in the Eighth Five-Year Plan capital investments in agriculture grew 60 percent and the gross agricultural product 21 percent; in the Ninth Five-Year Plan these figures were 60 and 13 percent respectively. Nor was there any appreciable change in this correlation in the 10th Five-Year Plan.

The prime costs of the main types of agricultural product are also continuing to grow. From 1965 through 1977 (both these were normal years in climatic conditions) they increased thus on the ESSR's kolkhozes: by a factor of 1.5 for grain; 2.1 for potatoes; 1.7 for cattle weight gain; 1.2 for hog weight gain; and 1.6 for milk. Roughly the same trend can be observed in other republics, both in the kolkhoz and also in the sovkhoz sectors. To what extent are these trends justified? There are attempts made to explain them by agriculture's transition to an industrial footing, which requires, as is known, a considerable increase in capital investments and material outlays on production. This is fair, to a certain extent. But we cannot recognize as natural the further preservation of the evolved rate of increase in the capital-output ratio, particularly the prime costs of the agricultural product. It is not only jeopardizing, considering the limitations on capital investments, the scheduled time of the solution of the food problem but also creating the danger of a considerable rise in the price of food commodities. The increase in prime costs is inevitably giving rise to the need for an increase in purchase prices, while the latter will sooner or later be reflected in the retail price level.

What is the reason for the insufficient efficiency of the investment of funds in agriculture and the growth of the prime costs of its product? External reasons--objective for agriculture--exist. These are primarily the increased costs of the producer goods supplied to agriculture by industry. And, moreover, the rise in prices is outstripping the increase in the productivity of the new equipment, the increase in the quality of mineral fertilizers and formula feed and so forth. The increased price of the producer goods is largely explained by the increased cost of fuel and raw material--they have to be extracted under deteriorating conditions. But the more acute the need for the search for and introduction of fundamentally new and considerably more efficient technical and technological solutions which would enable use to make up for the trend toward the rise in fuel and raw material prices. The time of the realization of all the important economic programs, including the food program, and the rate of growth of the people's well-being will ultimately depend on this.

But intrinsic reasons--shortcomings and disproportions in agriculture itself and in the servicing spheres directly connected with it--also exist. The famous German agrochemist [Yu. Libikh] once compared the effect of investments with the level of liquid in a vat. And he designated each plank (clapboard) of the vat a factor of efficiency. All the boards could be intact, and just one broken. But the entire result flows out through the broken board--the minimum factor. For this reason the most economical method of increasing efficiency is to influence the minimum factor or factors.

3. Overcoming the Restraining Factors

What are the factors reducing the efficiency of investments of funds in agriculture and restraining its growth? They vary. One affects merely the sphere of agricultural production, being mainly of a technical-organizational nature. The others take shape at the seams.

In May 1980 an Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum examined one of the "restraining factors--the lagging of the fodder base. And here the problem is not only one of an insufficient overall quantity of fodder limiting animal husbandry's further development; the problem is complicated to a certain extent by the fact that a unit of feed is becoming increasingly expensive, and this means an increase in the prime production costs of meat and milk. Specialists see as the solution the more rational use of our republic's soil-climatic potential and a corresponding improvement in the feed balance. Only thanks to the more rational location of crops, in accordance with the soil structure, is it possible to increase the overall productivity of farming and reduce the cost of a unit of feed by 15-20 percent. Unfortunately, until recently we have been increasing the sowings of cereals on not very suitable land. At the same time the cultivation of grasses on this land enables us to obtain comparatively more feed units and protein per hectare with comparatively less expenditure and, consequently, to correspondingly increase the proportion of coarse and succulent fodder and improve the protein balance.

The development of animal husbandry is being restrained not only by the lagging of the fodder base but also by the limited nature of labor resources. This problem is being solved to a certain extent by animal husbandry's transition to industrial techniques. But here also, considering the high capital-intensiveness of the construction of animal husbandry complexes and the limited nature of material resources and construction capacity, well-conceived strategy and tactics of capital investment are

essential. The resource-sparing path of animal husbandry's transition to an industrial footing whereby new construction is combined with the modernization of operating livestock sections and the addition thereto of more sophisticated production and social units which has been chosen by the republic appears to be economically expedient.

Restraining factors take shape not only in agricultural production itself; no less serious are the consequences of disproportions at the intersectorial, economic and social seams. Let us dwell on the main ones here.

The lagging of the production infrastructure—that is, the servicing spheres on which the ultimate efficiency of agricultural production also depends. We lose up to one-third of the product (feed, potatoes, vegetables, fruit, mineral fertilizer and so forth) at the harvesting, shipment, storage, processing and sale stages. This is connected with the fact that modern storage facilities and processing capacity meet from 40 to 60 percent of the requirement. For this reason investments channeled into ensuring the preservation and essential processing of the agricultural product in many cases produce a greater result than investments in an increase in its production. The decisions of the 26th congress provide perfectly justifiably for the preferential development of the production infrastructure in agriculture. But here we encounter one further restraining factor—the lagging and increased costs of construction, which are again largely brought about by the shortage of manpower and its insufficiently productive use.

Limitations pertaining to labor resources. The problem is not only that of their overall shortage; the number of hands in agriculture will continue to decline. But the higher the demands made on the quality of manpower in the countryside. The agricultural worker, whose labor activity at the industrial stage is connected both with biological and modern mechanical systems (the ultimate result depends largely on their correct combination), must have particularly high professional training and a sense of initiative and responsibility for the quality and end results of the labor. In these respects the demands made on the average worker of industrial agriculture appear even higher than on the average worker of other sectors of the economy. At the same time even at present the shortage of machine-operator personnel is being perceived increasingly acutely (which largely reduces the efficiency of investments in the acquisition of equipment) and a deterioration of the age and sex structure of agricultural workers and a number of other negative phenomena are occurring.

The retention of manpower in the countryside in the necessary qualitative and quantitative structure is a complex problem. It has been solved until recently to a large extent by the creation of additional material incentives—the level of pay in the ESSR's agriculture has even exceeded somewhat pay in other sectors of the economy. But its growth has been higher than the rate of increase in labor productivity. This has been a logical process, considering the complex nature of agricultural labor and the low level of its remuneration in the past. But the problem of personnel in the countryside cannot be solved in the future merely by increasing pay. More, an inordinate increase in pay exceeding the growth of labor productivity is a cause of the increased cost of agricultural products.

Under current conditions increasingly great significance for the solution of the personnel problem in the countryside is attached to pulling up the social infrastructure. The 26th CPSU Congress paid special attention to this. The directives

for the 11th Five-Year Plan provide for a relatively higher increase in expenditure on providing the countryside with amenities. But it is not simply a question of housing. There are many homesteads standing empty, and there will be increasingly more of them. And the reason is not simply that there is no running water, sewerage and central heating. These can be achieved in individual homes also. Increasingly great significance is attached to the location of the accommodation and its link with other elements of the social infrastructure (modern schools, stores, a cultural center, kindergarten-creches and other cultural-everyday establishments). It is easiest to create these in relatively large communities—rural centers. And such communities are already appearing in the republic. But here also it is necessary to take account of the tremendous capital-intensiveness of the program of rebuilding the countryside—it runs into many billions of rubles. For this reason we may tackle this problem in stages, pondering in depth and finding the optimum sizes and types of settlement and social services in the countryside. We would note that mistakes here entail major material and social losses. These include an unwarranted increase in the construction of high-rise apartments and the overly hasty liquidation of small rural schools and kindergarten-creches. The underutilization of the old accommodation reserve is also a waste. Many homes and buildings can still be renovated. There are rural and even urban residents who wish to increase production on a private farm. But they need help on a mutually profitable basis. The excessive concentration of the population in rayon centers and urban-type communities frequently leads to a loss of traditional ties to the land, which applies particularly to the young people, and, as a result, there is an irretrievable loss of valuable manpower for agriculture.

The not always well considered location and planning of the work of industrial enterprises and their branches and shops in rural localities operates in this same direction. They should not completely tear manpower away from agriculture but provide for the necessary maneuverability of its use and its size by season in agricultural and then in industrial production and also the more balanced application of male and female labor (after all, it has now become difficult to find a bride for a machine operator in the countryside). And here we again come to intersectorial relations.

4. An Important Resource--Pulling Up the Lagging Farms.

We have progressive, economically strong kolkhozes and sovkhoses--the gold reserves of the republic's agriculture. There are average farms. And there are lagging farms. The foremost farms are deservedly at the center of attention, they are written about frequently, they are visited by various delegations and so forth. But the problem of a further rise in and the increased efficiency of agricultural production cannot be solved thanks to these farms alone—even if even better production and social conditions are created on them.

There is considerable potential in the pulling up of the lagging farms, and the number thereof is not that insignificant. It is well known that, all other conditions being equal, it is possible to raise yield from 20 to 30 quintals per hectare with less expenditure than from 30 to 50 quintals per hectare or a cow's milk yield from 3,000 to 3,500 kilos than from 4,000 to 4,500 kilos. But the whole point is that all these conditions are not equal. Specially conducted studies have shown that two-thirds of the republic's lagging farms have relatively inferior natural-economic

conditions: the quality of the land is lower on them, and the provision with production capital is inadequate, and, consequently, the earning power and pay are considerably lower and production, housing and cultural conditions are worse. There is a departure of manpower primarily from precisely these farms, they experience an acute machine-operator shortage, skilled specialists cannot be retained and there are not enough young people. The threat of the emergence of irreversible processes is being created. If manpower departs, no financial and material injections will help. It is cheaper to undertake preventive work.

How to solve the problem of the lagging farms? It is easier to solve when the specific cause is insufficiently skilled leadership. There are frequent examples of good organizers and specialists coming to lead lagging farms and radically altering the situation. But a shuffling of personnel alone will not help where objectively inferior production and social conditions have evolved. It is essential right now even to channel material resources into overcoming the restraining factors which have evolved on these farms. Where are they to come from? It will be necessary to proceed toward a certain redistribution of resources at the expense of the strong farms. But will this not be a kind of social security and will not the socialist principle of distribution according to labor be undermined? Will equalization not lead to leveling and to egalitarianism?

Let us take a closer look at the source of the additional revenue obtained by the strong farms. This could be better work and a higher level of organization and operational activity. And the additional revenue thus obtained (it is usually called organizational) should logically go primarily to the farm on which it was created and for the further development of its production, an improvement in social conditions and additional incentives for the workers. But bigger revenues could also be obtained because a given farm has better land (and this belongs to the state) or has been able to obtain more equipment, fertilizer and formula feed (and these are limited--in short supply--in society). This additional revenue (it is called rental) is not the result of better operational activity alone. And it would be logical if part of it were to go on pulling up the lagging links in the overall chain.

In one way or another the strong helped the weak with their resources earlier also. More often than not this was by way of their merger in a single farm. But the consolidation process cannot be continued ad infinitum--the farms would become unmanageable. In addition, in the merger of the strong and the weak there are the same elements of social security which undermine the interests of the strong farms. It is more correct to redistribute part of the rental income. If the redistribution is carried out on the objective basis of an assessment of available land and material resources (and such an assessment with respect to the republic's farms has already been made), not only the firmness of the relations but also, and this is particularly important under the conditions of the growing limitations on resources, the economic responsibility of the farms for their efficient use will be secured. The more one receives from society, the more one is responsible to it. Such is a principle of socialism. It is only important that the strong farms' interest in the further development of production not be undermined. For this reason it could be a question of the redistribution of only part of the result obtained from the use of better land and capital.

[2 Sep 81 pp 1-2]

[Text] 5. Solving in Concert

The agricultural product is ultimately created by all enterprises of the agrarian-industrial complex, including construction, repair, processing and so forth. But the servicing enterprises and organizations of differing jurisdiction have their own departmental goals and interests, which far from always coincide with the ultimate goals of the agrarian-industrial complex. For example, the activity of enterprises of the State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture [Goskomsel'khoztekhnika] is assessed primarily in terms of the cost of the work done and the derived profit. There arises a concern to overstate the cost of operations while insufficient attention is paid to their timeliness and quality. The latter applies to a large extent to the construction organizations also. Whence the endeavor of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, which should be concerning themselves primarily with farming, to create, albeit small-scale, their "own" construction, repair and other subdivisions.

A better linking of the components of the agrarian-industrial complex could be achieved thanks to a refinement of management. It was pointed out at the CPSU Central Committee November (1979) Plenum and the 26th CPSU Congress that the food (agrarian-industrial) complex should be planned and managed as a single whole. But a refinement of management will produce the necessary result if it is underpinned by the unity of interests of all the components and the possibility of the intersectorial and interfarm maneuvering of resources (removing disproportions at the seams and pulling up the lagging elements) to achieve the ultimate goal--an improvement in food supplies to the population. And it is this which is real interfarm cooperation and agrarian-industrial integration.

Production, economic and social relations between agricultural and servicing enterprises take shape at different levels. These include comparatively close relations between neighboring farms for which it is economically expedient to create a common production and social infrastructure (warehouses and storage facilities, feed-preparation kitchens, modern communities with a set of social services and so forth) and to organize interfarm specialization and cooperation in agricultural production itself. More complex relations evolve in a rural rayon--the primary territorial agrarian-industrial complex. Agricultural enterprises and those servicing them--the rayon department of the Goskomsel'khoztekhnika construction and transport organizations, dairy and meat combines and so forth--function here. And, finally, the republic level of the agrarian-industrial complex, which consists of territorial (rayon) and sectorial (ministry and organization) elements connected with the production, processing and delivery to the consumer of the final product--food.

Interfarm cooperation and agrarian-industrial integration should develop correspondingly with the objectively evolving relations. Considering the complexity and innovative nature of the task and also the need to accumulate experience, this task is being tackled by stages in our republic. It was initiated by the Vil'yandiskiy experiment in 1975.

What is the essence of this experiment? What has it produced? What kind of problems has it raised? The Vil'yandiskoye Agricultural Association incorporated all the kolkhozes, sovkhozes and servicing and processing enterprises constituting the rayon's agrarian-industrial complex. These enterprises preserve their independence and, in a number of cases, dual subordination (to the association and to their own ministry or department). The association is organized on democratic principles and on its members' interest in their own and overall results of activity. At the head of the association is the council, on which all the farms are represented. With the help of scientists the association is developing and implementing a long-term program of the rayon's economic and social development. This is not merely a sum total of the plans of the individual farms. The program is subordinated to the task of the more efficient use of available resources for the purpose of an acceleration of the growth of the agricultural product and an improvement in the material, everyday and social living conditions of all the workers of the rayon agrarian-industrial complex.

To implement the comprehensive production and social program of the rayon's development the association's member-farms pooled part of their resources, creating common funds for development, sociocultural measures, mutual assistance and material incentive. Interfarm production and social facilities are erected, assistance is rendered farms which are lagging on account of objective reasons and there is additional encouragement of the operational links and persons who have made the biggest contribution to the common cause thanks to these funds.

Primary forms of cooperation--regional (group) associations incorporating several neighboring farms among whom the closest production and social relations are taking shape--have been created within the association framework.

Thus the primary association of the "Nuya" region incorporates 1 kolkhoz, 2 sovkhozes, the "Polli" Farming Institute Experimental Base and the Nuya branch of the Goskomsel'-khoztekhnika. Interfarm specialization and cooperation are developing within the primary association framework. An interfarm beef-production enterprise, an interfarm feed kitchen and a common mineral fertilizer storage facility are being built. The region should increasingly become the primary center of agricultural services (repair of equipment and reclamation systems, the agrochemical service, construction and so forth), which are developing on a cooperative basis. A "capital" of the

region--the Nuya community, where a sports complex attached to the school, a new polyclinic, an interfarm kindergarten and a children's music school are being installed with the pooling of resources (including those of the ministries of education and health)--is growing and being provided with amenities.

Thus processes of further socialization--common program, common affairs and common resources uniting the state and kolkhoz-cooperative sectors, agriculture and servicing and the production and social spheres--are under way in Vil'yandiskiy Rayon. And the association is producing fruit--clarity of perspective, great coordination and active influence on the restraining factors. All this makes it possible to make more efficient use of resources and time (saving approximately one-third compared with separate, unintegrated development) for the achievement of the set goal. In the 10th Five-Year Plan the Vil'yandiskoye Association scored big successes in agricultural production. Compared with the average annual level of the Ninth Five-Year Plan the production of cereals increased 39 percent, milk 21 percent and meat 38 percent.

But does the association not lead to a loss of the farms' initiative? This is a serious danger and it has to be reckoned with. The association currently centralizes 5-8 percent of the farms' profits. The bulk of the revenue obtained by the farms is used for their own development. In distributing the centralized resources the association takes account of the interests not only of the weak and lagging but also the strong and progressive farms. Large-scale production complexes, including those of interfarm significance, are created primarily on the economically sound sovkhoses and kolkhoses with experienced personnel and the corresponding base. For example, a hog-raising center was built and is being expanded on the Sovkhoz imeni Gagarin. An interfarm beef-production enterprise is being created under the auspices of the "Karksi" Kolkhoz. These farms, which are developing with the association's assistance on a modern basis highly profitable sectors, also have great economic responsibility to the association. Payments to the centralized funds of the Vil'yandiskoye Association have been determined in differentiated fashion per an assessment of resources (from R4.6 to R21 per hectare in 1979). And the Sovkhoz imeni Gagarin and the "Karksi" Kolkhoz had the biggest payments. But they were not hurt. Having received more resources and making better use of them, remaining at the disposal of the economically strong farms (for their own production and social development) is an appreciable proportion of the additional revenue. But whereas before, while obtaining resources in short supply, they displayed little concern for overall development, now a certain proportion of the additional revenue from the use of more productive resources goes for the realization of common programs of the association, including pulling up the farms which are lagging owing to objective reasons.

Having justified itself economically and socially, the Vil'yandiskiy experiment is becoming increasingly widespread here and in other republics. The Pyarnuskoye Rayon Agrarian-Industrial Association has been operating in accordance with roughly the same model since 1979. The effective maneuvering of resources there, which made it possible to pull up the lagging farms and components, was accomplished in a short time. As a result the rayon ended up in first place in the republic in the results of economic activity and was awarded the title of winner in all-union socialist competition. The Talsinskoye and Valmiyerskoy rayon agrarian-industrial associations have been created in the Latvian SSR, the Abashskoye in the Georgian SSR and so forth.

It was observed at the 18th Estonian Communist Party Congress that we may now firmly state that we have found an effective form of management at rayon level. The task now is to skillfully convey it to other rural rayons. At the same time we need to ponder in depth how best to manage the agrarian-industrial complex of the republic as a whole.

The republic agrarian-industrial complex is an objective reality. But it is functioning insufficiently efficiently. It is as yet the sum total of various ministries and departments of different jurisdiction at union and republic level with a separate system of planning, financing and management. The sectorial system of management with the division of functions among ministries and departments and their responsibility for the development of individual production and servicing spheres should be retained in the future also. But all the greater the significance which is attached to the integration of the components of the complex at republic level. Integration presupposes the orientation of all components toward the ultimate goal--obtaining the essential food with the least expenditure of aggregate resources per unit. It is very important to ensure that rayons of the republic which are lagging owing to objective reasons and which have manifestly inadequate resources for normal economic and social development be pulled up. And for this the republic agrarian-industrial complex should have a single long-term program and a single system of management with the right of the intersectorial and spatial redistribution of resources for the real achievement of the set goal.

The problem amounts to more than just the creation of an additional management body. We have quite enough people here involved in management and coordination. And their numbers are not to increase, in any event. It is a question of a change in the quality of management and of a guarantee of its integrality, promptitude and scientific approach. The creation of a council of the republic's agrarian-industrial complex made up of representatives of ministries, departments and territorial and specialized associations would appear expedient. The council should have a comparatively small staff, which would rely in its work on the existing planning authorities and scientific research institutes. But it is essential that definite functions and economic control funds be set aside for it.

A transition from the customary methods of administrative management to economic control is extremely important. A distinguishing feature of the latter is plan-gearred controlling influence by means of economic levers prompting the farms and departments, with regard for their interests, to the search for and realization of solutions which are the most efficient for society.

6. The Plan and Incentives

L.I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that the general direction of a refinement in management of the economy should provide for "a broadening of the independence of the associations and enterprises and the rights and responsibility of managers." Will this not lead to the undermining of the centralized planning principle? The party has always regarded the plan as a law whose requirements must be fulfilled. Such is an indispensable condition of the proportional and effective development of the entire economy. But this is only possible when the plan itself is scientifically substantiated and balanced. "The time has evidently come," it was said at the 26th congress, "to tighten the demands made both of plan discipline and the quality of the plans themselves."

How to enhance the quality of the plans handed down to agriculture and the agrarian-industrial complex? By further increasing perhaps the number of indicators for the enterprises? But it would seem to us that nowhere is the excessive regulation and specification of plan quotas as harmful as in agriculture. The party has repeatedly condemned the practice of the imposition on the farms of the structure of the sown areas, the numbers of the herd and so forth. A tremendous variety of soil, climatic and production conditions exists in agriculture which cannot be fully considered from above. And the imposed structures have far from always been optimal for given specific conditions. As a result the product produced has cost society too much.

Great harm has also been caused by the constant adjustment of plan quotas, their multiplicity of stages and so forth. The CPSU Central Committee July (1978) Plenum deemed it essential to effect a transition to fixed plan quotas for the 5-year plan with their orientation toward the final product--the plan of the supply (sale) to the state of food crops (grain and meat, milk and so forth) per hectare of cultivated land. But all hectares are not alike. In addition, different farms have a different quantity of capital and manpower. For this reason scientific planning presupposes consideration and evaluation of the real agrarian-economic potential of each republic, rayon and farm and also of its possible increase. It is also essential to take account of the fact that, given a high level of intensiveness and productiveness, a further increase in output requires comparatively greater investments. Whence all quotas of an increase in purchases of agricultural products should be balanced accordingly with reciprocal supplies of material-technical resources. It is essential in planning, of course, to also take account of the possibility of a comparative saving of resources for obtaining the final product connected with the progressive structural changes contained in the long-term programs of the development of the republic and rayon agrarian-industrial complexes.

The compilation of scientifically substantiated and balanced plans and reciprocal supplies of products broken down by year, rayon and farm is a most important condition of the efficient functioning of the economic mechanism. But this is not enough. For the realization of the plans and a quest for the best solutions it is essential to include an incentive system. The general principle here is simple--what society needs should be profitable to each economic component. But implementing this principle is not so easy. Particular significance is attached to the level and correlation of prices for sold output and services rendered.

The level of purchase prices for agricultural products was balanced as a result of implementation of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1956) Plenum. But in recent years the increasing preferential increase in prices for producer goods and services (construction, repairs and so forth) rendered agriculture has led to a reduction in the overall profitability of agricultural production below the necessary level. In addition, the production of some products is more profitable, while the production of others is barely profitable and loss-making even. And the result is that we are speaking to the farms in two languages, as it were. The language of the plan gives the command: produce and sell to the state a given product at all costs. The language of prices: if you produce this product, you will be putting yourself in a difficult economic position. And the farms look for a way out which is far from always the best for society--they cut back on the production of products which are barely profitable, but which society needs or ensure the fulfillment of quantitative quotas thanks to a deterioration in quality. This, for example, is how the situation has taken shape in the republic with vegetables and potatoes.

It would be naive to think that society could acquire agricultural products more cheaply than it costs to produce them. If we do not cover the socially normal costs in the price, we simply have to finance expenditure or grant the farms credit and subsequently write off the debts. But, in any event, the economic prophylaxis contained in normal prices (not overstated and not understated) costs society less than treatment of the neglected illnesses which arise as a result of a chronic shortage of essential resources or, on the contrary, society's coverage of all expenditure.

For this reason it is extremely important to remove the trend toward the increased costs of the producer goods and services obtained by agriculture from other spheres. This requires fundamentally new and more efficient technical, technological and organizational solutions. If an increase in the prices of industrial commodities is connected with the increased costs of energy and raw material, it should be taken into consideration, and agriculture should be compensated accordingly. Optimizing the correlation of purchase prices for certain agricultural products--making them roughly equally profitable and thereby stimulating the rational location and concentration of the production of a given product in accordance with the natural-economic conditions most conducive to it--is possible only by price adjustment by the method of discounts and surcharges by the republic authorities. It is only important that the overall level of prices determined for the republic be adequate. The problem could be solved with the establishment of uniform purchase prices for animal husbandry products and potatoes for the Baltic republics, which have roughly identical natural-economic conditions of their production.

As interfarm, intersectorial and interrayon relations develop, increasingly great significance for the increased economic efficiency of the functioning of the agrarian-industrial and food complexes is attached to the transition of these relations to a firm contractual foundation providing for the economic partners' mutual profit and material responsibility for loss. The reservation for some party or other of a monopoly or exclusive position enabling it to impose on its economic partner decisions unfavorable to it and society here seems dangerous to us.

In the plan-gearred management mechanism an extremely important place is occupied by the evaluation and stimulation (material and moral) of the results of economic activity. Until recently it was oriented toward the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan for the production and procurement of products. All was seemingly correct --it is extremely important for us to obtain as much agricultural output as possible. But the real mechanism of economic relations does not always heed our wishes. We stimulate fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan, and the farms conceal reserves (it is more difficult to produce an increase from a high level), strive for artificially low plans and shake out resources in short supply by hook or by crook. As a result actual growth is less than is possible and costs too much. For an improvement in supplies to the population it is essential to ensure fulfillment of the state plan for an increase in purchases of agricultural products. Incidentally, an addition to the purchase price has been established in the new 5-year plan not for the sale to the state of above-plan products but for exceeding the average annual farm procurement level achieved in the 10th Five-Year Plan. We would note that here also a comparatively big gain could accrue to those which have as yet made insufficient use of available resources. Kh. Kallaste, director of the "Vinni" Sovkhoz, has already written in SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA about the question of the criterion of evaluation of activity. I recall what he said: "The intensiveness of production on a farm is not taken into consideration when the bonuses are being totted up. It just

has to show a rate of growth. Some shirker barely has to lift a finger, and he has a growth rate. He has a bonus, while we have our salaries."

Consequently, the achieved level of production is important. The rate is also important. We need to build up agricultural production. But even more important, particularly under current conditions, when we are encountering growing resource limitations, is the price at and the expenditure of resources with which a given level and an increase in output were achieved.

Scientists of our republic (of the ESSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and ESSR Ministry of Agriculture Institute of Farming) conducted a comprehensive economic assessment of agriculture's available resources (land, production capital, manpower). This assessment makes it possible to obtain a normative indicator of output and revenue (profit) for each kolkhoz and sovkhoz. Comparison of the normative indicator with the product and revenue actually obtained provides us with an indicator of the actual efficiency of the use of resources. And it has transpired that differences in the efficiency of the use of resources amount to 350-400 percent for the republic's farms. What was most surprising at first sight was that more than one-half of the republic's farms with a very high production level had an indicator of the efficiency of the use of resources which was lower than the republic average. And this means that their leaders' main efforts have been directed toward the acquisition of additional resources which have not always been used in the best manner.

For this reason it seems to us extremely important to link the system of planning and incentive with a comprehensive assessment of the farms' resources constituting their real agrarian-economic potential and with the efficiency of their use. The problem was raised in extremely timely fashion at the 18th Estonian Communist Party Congress. The determination of an entire system of economic obligations (purchase plans and payments to the budget and republic and rayon funds) and also the distribution of resources and evaluation of the results of economic activity depending on the efficiency of each component's use of available agrarian-economic potential will contribute to the successful accomplishment of a most important economic task set by the 26th CPSU Congress for the more rational use of the country's production potential for the speediest achievement of the set goals.

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REGIONAL

UZBEK LEADERSHIP HITS SHORTCOMINGS IN COTTON PRODUCTION

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 15 Aug 81 pp 1-2

[Text] The Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee and the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers note that the party, soviet, agricultural and procurement organs, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and enterprises of the republic in implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 20th Uzbekistan Communist Party Congress and as a result of the great assistance and daily attention of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have been conducting strenuous work to overcome difficulties, which arose as a result of this year's unfavorable weather conditions, and to ensure production and sale to the state in the first year of the 11th 5-Year Plan period of 5.9 million tons of raw cotton, including 375,000 tons of fine-fibred variety and at least 3.9 million tons of the yield harvested by machines.

However, as indicated by the results of mutual inspections, there are still rayons and farms where negligence has been allowed in organization and performance of work and in preparation for harvesting and procurement of the new yield.

On some farms in Dzhizakskaya, Surkhandar'inskaya, Bukharskaya, Kashkadarinskaya and Khorezmskaya Oblasts and Karakalpakskaya ASSR the quality of irrigation is poor and cultivation is not conducted on time, without complete sets of tools and is of poor quality. As a result there are areas abounding with weeds. Organic fertilizers are used insufficiently. The inspection service has not been organized on a proper level and focal infections of agricultural pests are not uncovered and treated promptly, thus allowing them to spread. Ground-based equipment, toxic chemicals and biological methods for combating these are being used inefficiently.

Serious shortcomings and neglect have been uncovered in preparation of equipment. A considerable quantity of cotton pickers, tractor trailers, cotton extractors and other equipment is not yet ready for work. On farms in Kegeyliyskiy, Beruniyskiy, Gurlenskiy, Koshkupyrskiy, Ishtykhanskiy, Zarbdarskiy, Akhunbabayevskiy and Alatskiy Rayons the readiness of cotton pickers is 40-75 percent. Not all harvesting equipment and transportation means are included in repairs. Machine operators in Bukharskaya, Namanganskaya and Khorezmskaya Oblasts and Karakalpakskaya ASSR have been insufficiently enlisted in repair work.

Instances of poor quality repair have been permitted. Of the repaired cotton pickers which were inspected 16 percent in kolkhozes and sovkhoses and 17 percent at repair enterprises of the State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture of the Uzbek SSR had serious violations of repair specifications. At the imeni Zhdanov sovkhos in Kashkadarinskaya Oblast the 29 prepared cotton pickers had some 30 defects and in the "Moskva" kolkhoz in Gurlenskiy Rayon 50 percent of the repaired machines had flaws.

Proper attention has not been given to training and improving the skills of machine operators. In Bukharskaya Oblast there is a shortage of 500 drivers of cotton pickers for two-shift work.

Plants of the All-Union Production Association for the Production of Machines for Cotton Cultivation [VPO Soyuzmashkhlopkovodstva] have failed to insure timely supply of necessary individual spare parts and this has delayed repairs of harvesting equipment.

Preparation of procurement centers for receiving raw cotton is progressing slowly. The plan for installation of automatic scales has been fulfilled by 71 percent, for construction of new asphalt-paved baling platforms by 72 percent and for preparation of calibrating standards by 89 percent. Repairs of mechanical equipment are lagging in Dzhizakskaya, Syrdarinskaya and Surkhandarinskaya Oblasts.

The Uzbek Association for the Production of Cotton Farming Machinery [Uzbekkhlopkomash] has not ensured timely supply of spare parts, units and sets of machinery for the repair of ginneries, drying and cleaning shops and mechanical equipment.

In the adopted decree the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee and the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers stressed that the urgent task of obkoms and raykom raykoms, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers, oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms, the Uzbekistan Council of Trade Unions and the Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee; ministries of agriculture, cotton ginning industry, land reclamation and water resources and procurement of the Uzbek SSR; the Main Administration for Irrigation and Construction of State Farms in Central Asia [Glavsredazirstroy], the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and their local organs; and supervisors and specialists of kolkhozes, sovkhoses and enterprises is to enlist efforts of worker's collectives in eliminating the lag in cotton industry development, in raising the rate of care for sown areas, in conducting timely and high-quality irrigation, in cultivating sown areas and in organizing a struggle against weeds and agricultural pests aimed at ensuring accumulation of a large and early harvest of good fiber raw cotton, completion of all preparatory work for collecting and delivering it to the state and achieving unconditional fulfillment by every kolkhoz, sovkhos, enterprise, section and team of the socialist pledges assumed for 1981.

For this purpose:

--Outline and implement in every brigade, kolkhoz and sovkhoz, with consideration of the state of cotton plant development, a complex of agrotechnical measures for strengthening the care of sown areas and enlist for this purpose all able-bodied people, equipment and mechanisms by establishing necessary cultural and personal conditions for their productive work;

--Increase the rate of repairs of cotton pickers, trailers, loaders, cotton extractors, cotton-scraping machines and pick-up attachments of means of maintenance and preparation for conducting ground defoliation and take into consideration that equipment preparation must be completed not later than two weeks before the beginning of harvesting work. Organize repair brigades and teams in every kolkhoz and sovkhoz, enlist all machine operators who are not working in the fields in repair work, provide them necessary conditions for two-shift work and develop socialist competition for timely and qualitative preparation of equipment;

--Repair enterprises of the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture must insure fulfillment of established plans and tasks for high-quality repairs of cotton picking equipment, sets of machinery, units and their engines, deliver them promptly to farms and organize two-shift work of all repair workshops and plants;

--Activate the work of standing commissions on checking the quality of repairs and storage of agricultural equipment. Raise the responsibility of workers of the State Agricultural Inspectorate and supervisors and specialists of farms for high quality repairs and preparation of harvesting equipment;

--In the days immediately ahead complete staffing cotton pickers with experienced drivers and organizing harvesting-transportation detachments and supply them with means of maintenance and replacement stocks of units, sets of machinery, spare parts and repair materials. Improve the skills of drivers of cotton pickers everywhere and train them in leading methods of highly-productive equipment utilization;

--By 20 August ensure preparation of airfields, loading mechanisms and capacities, delivery of defoliant and staffing and training of personnel to carry out the defoliation;

--Ensure delivery of fuel and lubricants for continuous operation of harvesting equipment and means of transportation and devote special attention to their use in a thrifty and rational manner;

--Before the beginning of harvesting complete construction of new and repairs of existing field camps, asphalt-paved areas [khirmans], roads, bridges and weighing facilities;

--Expediently allocate areas for mechanical picking of cotton in sizes that will ensure successful fulfillment of assumed socialist pledges within shortest

possible periods, depending on the biological ripening of the plants, and conduct defoliation of cotton;

--Ensure the airplanes operating on the farms with dependable mechanized means for refuelling and loading defoliants and with washing and refuelling devices, establish proper cultural and personal conditions and medical services for airplane crews and assign them to farms immediately upon arrival;

--Introduce the Tashkent method of cultivating cotton plants, conducting defoliation and organizing harvesting and procurement of raw cotton. Ensure high-quality use of ground-based and harvesting equipment and transport and loading facilities;

--Improve the use of cotton pickers in harvesting fine-fiber varieties and raise the level of mechanization of harvesting;

--Widely adopt measures to provide moral and material incentives to leaders of cotton growing teams, drivers and pickers of cotton for high-quality harvesting and preventing losses of raw cotton;

--Prepare necessary lodgings for cotton pickers and machine operators engaged in harvesting, with good insulation, lighting and supply of fuel and observe sanitation and hygiene conditions in them. Organize public dining and trade facilities. Improve the work of children's preschool institutions.

Obkoms and raykoms, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers and oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms; the UzSSR ministries of Agriculture, Cotton Ginning Industry and Procurement, Glavsredazirsovkhozstroy and the UzSSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and their local organs; the Central Asian branch of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin [VASKhNIL]; the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Cotton Growing; the Scientific Research Institute of Cotton Plant Breeding and Seed Growing imeni G. S. Zaytsev; and the Uzbekistan Association for the Procurement and Sale of High-Quality Cotton Seeds [Uzsortsemkhlopkoprom] were suggested to:

--Conduct organizational and explanatory work everywhere among supervisors, specialists and team leaders of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, drivers of cotton pickers, hand pickers and procurement center workers on the state importance of increasing, as of 1982, the additional charge to procurement prices in force for raw cotton and cotton plant seeds and the harvesting and procurement of high-quality raw cotton within the shortest possible periods without losses and also for preventing its spoilage during harvesting, hauling, storing and processing;

--Allocate the best, high-quality productive sown areas for the procurement of seed stock, ensuring maximum allocation to seed cotton areas rezoned this year and new perspective varieties of cotton plants possessing high-quality fibers. Conduct defoliation of sown seed areas, with the exception of those earmarked to be mechanically harvested by multistage machines, after completing manual picking of seed cotton and fulfilling the task of procuring seed stock by every rayon and seed growing farm;

--Raise personal responsibility of supervisors and specialist of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, procurement organizations, teams and pickers for harvesting, receiving, storing and processing of seed cotton according to the requirement of the All-Union State Standard;

--For the purpose of material motivation of cotton seed pickers make it incumbent upon directors of sovkhoses and recommend to kolkhoz administrations to establish work norms in manual seed cotton harvesting 20-25 percent below the norm established for harvesting industrial raw cotton;

--Ensure preferential placement and storing of seed cotton harvested by multi-stage machines on plant territories of cotton procurement centers, time its priority cleaning not later than 30 days after making up batches, completing its primary processing in drying and cleaning shops before placing it in bales. Prevent conversion of seed cotton to industrial raw cotton.

The Uzbek Civil Aviation Administration must provide the necessary number of airplanes and helicopters on demand of the UzSSR Ministry of Agriculture. Crew commanders must be required to strictly observe the established defoliation rules, ensure high-quality work and productive use of airplanes and observe conditions of labor safety practices.

For purpose of timely haulage of raw cotton from the republic's virgin land sovkhoses, the UzSSR Ministry of Motor Transport and oblispolkoms must assign 850 cotton-hauling vehicles to Dzhizakskaya, Kashkadarinskaya, Surkhandarinskaya and Syrdarinskaya Oblasts for the duration of the harvesting period.

The UzSSR ministries of Agriculture and Cotton Ginning Industry, Glavsredazirsovkhozstroy, the republic administration of the USSR State Committee for Standards and the Tashkent "Etalon" experimental plant must by the harvesting season complete the repair and marking of weighing and measuring instruments in kolkhozes, sovkhoses, cotton plants and procurement centers.

The Uzbekbriyash, the UzSSR ministries of Trade and Cotton Ginning Industry, the UzSSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture, the UzSSR Gossnab, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers and oblispolkoms are charged with supplying the required quantities of spring balance scales, aprons, sacks, flasks, coal, stoves and hot-water boilers as well as clothing, footwear, foodstuffs and other goods needed by the villages during the cotton harvesting and procurement period.

The UzSSR ministries of Light and Local Industries, Internal Affairs and Cotton Ginning Industry are ordered to ensure timely and complete supply to the republic's consumer cooperative organizations of special clothing, kersey boots, packing fabric, cast iron stoves and other necessary supplies and make up for underloading of these goods from the funds of the first half of the year.

The UzSSR ministries of Road Construction and Maintenance, Agriculture and Cotton Ginning Industry, Glavsredazirsovkhozstroy, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers and oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms are charged to conduct, before the start of cotton harvesting, the repairs of motor roads and bridges,

based on ownership, and also of access routes to kolkhozes, sovkhoses and procurement centers.

The All-Union Production Association for the Production of Machines for Cotton Cultivation [VPO "Soyuzmashkhlopkovodstva"] will ensure supply to agriculture of necessary spare parts for repairs of harvesting equipment and the Uzbek Association for the Production of Cotton Farming Machinery ["Uzbekkhlopkomash"] will ensure production and supply of equipment and spare parts to cotton plants.

The UzSSR Gosstab will supply necessary rolled metal products to enterprises of Uzbekkhlopkomash, in accordance with allocated funds.

The UzSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers and oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms are ordered to inspect fire safety in advance in all kolkhozes, sovkhoses and procurement centers as well as fulfillment of measures recommended by organs of the State Fire Inspectorate.

The UzSSR ministries of Culture, Consumer Services, Health and Communications are to work out and implement measures to ensure exemplary services to kolkhoz farmers, sovkhos workers, enlisted and other workers engaged in harvesting and procurement of raw cotton.

For the purpose of ensuring the manpower requirements of enterprises producing baling fabric, the UzSSR State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education will assign against the training plan of the UzSSR Ministry of Light Industry graduates of technical school No 85 to the Tashkent ambary hemp factory in accordance with coordinated trades.

Obkoms and raykoms, the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Council of Ministers, oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms, the UzSSR Ministry of Agriculture and Glavredazirsovkhozstroy and their local organs are charged with working out and implementing measures jointly with trade union organizations aimed at making available from the beginning of harvesting all able-bodied people in kolkhozes, sovkhoses and agricultural enterprises to harvest cotton and with developing socialist competition for fulfillment and overfulfillment of daily norms by all drivers of cotton pickers and hand pickers of cotton. Also to widely use measures of moral and material stimulation of machine operators, kolkhoz farmers and sovkhos workers engaged in harvesting raw cotton.

The republic, oblast and rayon trade union committees of agricultural workers of the Uzbek SSR must ensure control over correct and timely payment of wages to kolkhoz farmers, sovkhos workers and machine operators as well as adherence to rules for labor safety procedures and practices while working with defoliants and machines.

The Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee must ensure active participation of Komsomol organizations in preparing equipment and drivers and in broadly developing socialist competition for top quality harvesting and procurement of raw cotton of the new harvest.

For the purpose of providing incentive to the Karakalpakskaya ASSR, oblasts, rayons, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, leading machine operators and hand pickers of cotton for high rate of harvesting and high grade of the raw cotton delivered to the state to institute challenge red banners of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet and the UzSSR Council of Ministers:

--Two red banners for the Karakalpakskaya ASSR and oblasts;

--Four red banners for rayons, including one for encouraging rayons delivering raw cotton of the fine-fiber variety to the state and one red banner for encouraging virgin land rayons;

--Three red banners for sovkhoses, including a red banner for encouraging virgin land sovkhoses and one for sovkhoses delivering fine-fiber raw cotton;

--Two red banners for kolkhozes, including one for kolkhozes delivering fine-fiber raw cotton.

To award challenge red banners once every 10 days, beginning with the results for the first 10-day period in September. In awarding red banners, fulfillment of the plan for overall volume of procurement and of the plan for machine harvesting of raw cotton must be taken into consideration.

In oblasts having a plan for production of fine-fiber raw cotton, introduce a conversion factor for the purpose of equating this cotton to a medium-fiber variety, in summing up the results: for Kashkadarinskaya and Surkhandarinskaya Oblasts of 1.3; and for Bukharskaya and Namanganskaya Oblast of 1.5.

Simultaneously with presentation of red banners allocate to the Karakalpakskaya ASSR and oblasts for the sale to drivers of cotton pickers who have achieved the best indexes for productivity and quality of cotton harvesting four passenger cars and 2000 rubles for cash awards; two passenger cars to rayons for sale to the best drivers and 500 rubles for awarding leading workers; one passenger car to sovkhoses for sale to the best drivers and 300 rubles for awarding leading workers; and one passenger car to kolkhozes for sale to the best drivers and 200 rubles for awarding leading workers.

For rayons, kolkhozes and sovkhoses which have been awarded red banners for high rate of harvesting and delivery of fine-fiber cotton to the state establish the following awards: three passenger cars for rayons for sale to the best drivers of cotton pickers and 700 rubles for awarding to leading workers; two passenger cars for sovkhoses for sale to drivers and 500 rubles for awarding leading workers; and two passenger cars for kolkhozes for sale to the best drivers and 300 rubles for awarding leading workers. Sell the aforementioned passenger cars to the best drivers of cotton pickers from the marketable stock of consumer cooperatives.

Obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and party organizations of industrial enterprises and construction projects are charged with organizing aid through sponsorship of

kolkhozes, sovkhoses and procurement centers in construction and repair of asphalt-paved areas, drying and cleaning shops and intraorganizational roads and bridges as well as in repair and maintenance of cotton harvesting equipment.

The UzSSR Committee of People's Control, the UzSSR ministries of internal affairs, cotton ginning industry, agriculture and procurement, Glavsredazir-sovkhosstroy and the UzSSR State Committee for Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture are ordered to strengthen control over the progress of preparations for harvesting in kolkhozes, sovkhoses, preservation and careful expenditure of material and technical resources and to devote particular attention to preventing losses and spoilage of cotton during harvesting, transportation, storage and processing.

The editorial offices of republic, oblast and rayon newspapers, Uzbek Telegraph Agency [UzTAG] and UzSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting are charged with regularly elucidating in newspapers and over television and radio the progress of preparations for harvesting and procurement of raw cotton and the progress of harvesting and delivery of the new yield. Institute a board of honor on the pages of republic newspapers and record on it the oblasts and rayons which prefulfilled the plan for raw cotton procurement.

The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and the UzSSR Council of Ministers have expressed confidence that party, soviet, agricultural and procurement organs, trade union and Komsomol organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, agricultural and industrial enterprises and the working people of the republic through their selfless labor and by broadly developing socialist competition will ensure a large and early harvest of raw cotton everywhere, carry out the harvesting campaign in an organized manner and within shortest possible periods while maintaining high work quality and will achieve unconditional fulfillment of socialist pledges assumed for 1981 and thereby make their worthy contribution to fulfillment of the tasks of the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan and the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 20th Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party.

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REGIONAL

KIRGHIZ PRESS FOR CONTROL OF ISSYK-KUL' DEVELOPMENT

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 16 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by I. Kadyrbekov, candidate of architecture and chief of the "Kirgizgiprostroy" Planning Department: "Too Many Cooks..."]

[Text] Issyk-Kul'.... How many poets have dedicated their poems to it, how many writers have chosen it as the setting for their stories, tales and novels.

But Issyk-Kul' has come to be spoken of in recent years in the language of practical prose. Scientists, planners and builders have been expressing themselves in articles and letters on how to multiply the glory of the Issyk-Kul' region. And this is natural. Issyk-Kul' is becoming an all-union resort. Tens of thousands of working people from different corners of our country spent their vacation and were reinvigorated here this year. This is gratifying.

Nonetheless, let us face the truth head-on. Do people traveling to Issyk-Kul' always return home completely satisfied? No, not always. And there are solid reasons for this. Let us try to investigate some of them. It was not that long ago that discussion of the future resort zone appeared almost exhausted. The main provisions of the plan of its district layout had been elaborated. They provide for the comprehensive development of the region over the long term. The plan is of a generalized nature, it is true.

However, as time has shown, even this document has taken far from all factors into account. As a result, people are being guided by the plan, but carefully and cautiously. For many of the problems which were supposed to have been settled remained. They have now been enveloped by many other questions. First, our people are living an increasingly better life with every passing year, and their cultural requirements are increasing. When they come to Issyk-Kul', they wish to have more than just a place to sleep for the night. They need comfortable accommodation, cultural centers and much else.

Nor are people indifferent to the surrounding landscape. The nature of Issyk-Kul' is inimitable. But the mass influx of vacationers, particularly unorganized vacationers, is at times causing it irremediable harm.

How to avoid this conflict? Only on the basis of the comprehensive, plan-oriented development of the region as a whole and individual vacation centers. Unfortunately,

this has not yet been achieved. The lack of a developed comprehensive program incorporating a refinement in management, planning and designing methods is leading to the point where the resort facilities are being developed, it may be said, spontaneously, without consideration of many factors. Yet there are many examples in the country of resort zones growing comprehensively. We do not have to go far for examples. Yurmala, Palanga, Klaypeda, Pitsunda and others serve to illustrate how matters should be organized.

Issyk-Kul' has a long way to go to catch up with these examples. And, we believe, the main reason for this is the absence of one master in resort building. Who should it be? The local soviets of Issyk-Kul'skaya Oblast, the Kirghiz SSR Gosstroy, the KiSSR Council of Trade Unions? Currently all of them, with certain rights and obligations, are deciding only individual questions within the framework of their competence. A general, directing "hand," however, is not in evidence.

This has led to the point where the real masters of the Issyk-Kul' area are numerous departments of Kirghizia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are also determining the basic policy of resort management. Each, depending on his economic possibilities, is building to this extent or the other comfortable boarding houses, recreation centers, preventoria and pioneer camps. Some permit themselves the construction of a heated swimming pool and year-round bedroom suites with all conveniences. Others, however, are not in a position to put in modern engineering services.

But the small collectives and the local kolkhozes and sovkhozes remain in the most disadvantageous position, perhaps. They frequently lack the resources for the construction of recreational establishments. How are their workers and the members of their families, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the republic's population, to take their vacation? Are the KiSSR Council of Trade Unions and the Tourism Office in a position to satisfy their requirements and grant a pass to each? As practice shows, no.

Of all the difficulties of resort construction today, the most complex are organizational difficulties. But however difficult they are, they can, I believe, be overcome. Our socialist building has formulated many efficient methods of management. And not the least of these is the pooling of resources and the formation of intersectorial associations. This form was widespread in the first years of Soviet power. And today also it has not only not lost its significance but is gaining increasingly new positions. We believe that it could be successfully applied in resort construction in Issyk-Kul'. There are no obstacles in its path in principle. It is only necessary to display initiative. The decisive role here should, I believe, be assigned the local soviets. It is they, having amalgamated the financial resources of the departments, which could be the legislators in resort construction. And it would perhaps be worthwhile granting them the right of the compulsory amalgamation of capital even. If you want a boarding house or recreation center, allocate resources, and the local power organ will deal with the rest.

The pooling of resources would make it possible to tackle many problems pertaining to the comprehensive development of the Issyk-Kul' area and environmental conservation.

But what do we see currently? The "Kirgizgiprostroy" Institute, for example, developed a draft of the detailed layout of the "Bozteri" and "Dolinka" resorts system. It presupposed the creation of entire complexes with a single system of engineering services, the uniform architecture of the boarding houses and recreation centers and with all essential services. Although certain of the draft's provisions were debatable, it has nonetheless remained the basis on which these two big resort centers could be developed.

But the draft has had an unenviable fate. Owing to the lack of a single source of financing and departmental separation, it has remained on paper. Each enterprise and each ministry with recreation centers here continues to boss the show as it sees it, giving not the slightest thought to the fate of the neighbors and the zone as a whole.

The transfer of the functions of single master of the resort zone to the local authorities would also ginger up the planners to a considerable extent. Those who create its appearance. Let's face it, they are still not always approaching the solution of this problem or the other from scientifically substantiated positions. Of course, it may be said now that the resort zone will be incorporated in the Issyk-Kul'-Chuyskiy territorial-production complex. And that it will take shape on a strictly scientific basis. Consequently, questions of resort development also will be reflected here.

But it must be considered that scientific-technical substantiation of the creation of the territorial-production complex will initially be of a general nature and that many details of resort construction may simply be dropped from it. But the details now are acquiring tremendous significance--after all, it is necessary to develop the problems of individual areas and complexes of the recreation zone. But it is these which are being developed, it may be said, gropingly, as yet.

We cannot manage here without experimental planning. We need systematic attempts at modeling the architectural-layout structure and appearance of the resort complexes. Thanks to its clearness, each such model will enable us to amend the concept of the future and could engender new ideas, pose new problems and suggest ways to overcome them.

And many problems have to be solved. The resort season in Issyk-Kul' lasts 4-5 months. In this case, in what correlation do the major buildings and installations need to be built? How will the cultural-social centers function when the season is over? What about the labor resources? And, generally, what to do about the "temporary" process, which is presenting many tasks for the cultural-social service of the indigenous population and the vacationers. After all, at the height of the season the influx of vacationers increases to such an extent that difficulties arise in supplies of food products and industrial commodities, transport services and power supply. These questions are being tackled to the extent that forces and opportunities allow, but far from as time demands.

The lagging in the theoretical substantiation of this decision or the other is leading to various complications. Recreational establishments which were built 10 years ago in accordance with seemingly economical plans are now sometimes being modernized and expanded, which is costing a pretty penny.

There is no doubt that it is impossible to do everything all at once and that many details of resort development cannot be foreseen for dozens of years ahead. Nor is there, evidently, any need for this. But we must, are obliged, nevertheless, to take into consideration and foresee the basic social and scientific-technical changes for the long term and not sacrifice them to benefits of the moment. This is in the interests of today's generations and in the interests of those who will visit the shores of Issyk-Kul' in the future.

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10 Nov 1981